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COMMENTS 
Consumer Protection in Michigan: Current Methods and 
Some Proposals for Reform 
During the past decade, a great deal of effort has been expended 
at all levels of government in the United States to enhance the pros-
perity of the poor and underprivileged elements of society. Much 
legislation has been passed-especially at the federal leveP-but it 
has been incomplete in that its main thrust has been simply to in-
crease the income levels of poor people without a corresponding ef-
fort to ensure that they receive their money's worth as consumers.2 
As a result, the long-standing evil of fraud in the market place has 
not been significantly reduced, but has contributed to the serious 
economic and social problems that confront contemporary society.3 
It has been estimated, for example, that, in purely monetary terms, 
Michigan consumers lose as much as one hundred million dollars 
annually to fraudulent merchants.4 This loss is particularly devastat-
ing since the victims of the unethical and deceptive practices are 
very often persons with low incomes who cannot easily bear financial 
loss.5 Consumer fraud thus tends to reinforce the vicious circle of 
poverty with its attendant social ills. 
Fraudulent business practices have also contributed to the vio-
lent upheavals that have occurred in urban ghetto areas in recent 
years. A study of the 1967 Detroit riots concluded that a primary 
cause of the violence that erupted was the sense of frustration that 
the people of the inner city felt as a result of (I) constant exposure 
to dishonest merchants, (2) perpetual indebtedness because of too 
liberal and too costly extensions of credit, and (3) the inability to 
I. See Manpower Development and Training Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2571-628 (Supp. IV, 
1965-1968); Economic Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-994d (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
See also Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 802, 83 Stat. 676 (special tax 
allowance for low-income taxpayers). 
2. See Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 746 (1967). 
3. For an examination of the problem of consumer fraud in the United States, 
especially as that problem relates to the inner city, see H. BLACK, Buy Now PAY 
LATER (1967); D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE (1967); W. MAGNUSON 8e J. CARPER, 
THE DARK SIDE OF THE MARKETPLACE (1968). The only comparable work on consumer 
fraud in Detroit is Focus: Hope 68, a study of comparative food and drug prices and 
services in the Detroit metropolitan area. 
4. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E., at 1, col. 4. 
5. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MoRE 105-36 (1967). A study by the Federal Trade 
Commission of the customers of those merchants in the District of Columbia most 
likely to engage in fraudulent sales practices and to charge inordinately high prices 
showed that the average purchaser was supporting an abnormally large family (3.6 to 
4.3 members) on an income below the average for the district (.$4,176 as compared to 
an average of $6,920). FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLIIIENT CREDIT AND RETAIL 




seek redress for economic grievances because of the complexity and 
inaccessibility of the legal system.6 
There has been some governmental response to the critical prob-
lem of consumer fraud, although to date it has been manifestly 
inadequate. President Nixon recently announced the entry of the 
federal government into the fight against fraud in the market place 
with the statement that "[c]onsumerism-Upton Sinclair and Rachel 
Carson would be glad to know-is a healthy development that is 
here to stay."7 Unfortunately, there has been little effective federal 
legislation8 or enforcement, and the consumer remains substantially 
unshielded by federal law from businessmen, who, like Babbit, are 
"nimble in the calling of selling houses for more than people could 
afford to pay."0 As a result, the consumer must look to state and local 
governments for whatever protection is available against unscrupu-
lous merchants. The states too, however, have been less than zealous 
guardians of consumer interests. In most states, consumer fraud 
problems are dealt with by statutes that are confusing, disjointed, 
and incomplete,10 and by procedures that are cumbersome and ineffi-
cient.11 But perhaps the most serious problem is one of misplaced 
priorities. Seldom do officials ·who are charged with the responsibility 
of safeguarding consumer interests direct their primary efforts toward 
the element of society most seriously and persistently exploited in 
the market place-the low-income consumer.12 
The State of Michigan is certainly no exception to the general 
pattern, insofar as consumer protection is concerned. Its consumer 
fraud legislation is ill-conceived, and its enforcement procedures are 
inadequate. But most discouraging is the state's apparent lack of 
concern about the seriousness of the problem of fraud in the market 
6. That study was undertaken by the Detroit Free Press and The Detroit Urban 
League. See also NATIONAL .ADVISORY COMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 274 (1968). 
7. Address to Congress on Consumer Affairs, Oct. 31, 1969, in N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 
1969, at 22, col. I. 
8. There has been some such legislation, however. Fair Packaging & Labeling Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-61 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968); Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1601-77, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
9. S. LEWIS, BABBIT 1 (1922). 
10. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer 
Tra11saclion Problems, 48 B.U. L. REv. 559, 583-88 (1968); Saxbe, The Role of the 
Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of 
the Ohio Attorney General, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 901-04, 908-15 (1968); Note, The 
Regulation of Advertising, 56 CouJM. L. REv. 1018, 1057-72 (1956). 
11. Note, supra note 10, at 1063-65; Developments in the Law-False Advertising, 
80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1123 (1967). 
12. See Installment Sales: The Plight of the Low Income Buyer, 2 CoLUM. J.L. &: 
Soc. PROB. l (1966); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1969). For an examination of the current inability of the legal sys-
tem to protect consumers, see D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 155-70; Hester, Deceptive 
Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy'!, 
1968 Duia: L.J. 831. 
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place, a problem which daily confronts poor and uneducated con• 
sumers; the various units of governments in Michigan simply have 
not been willing to provide the funds and manpower necessary to 
combat the problem successfully.13 
A necessary adjunct to any legal reform in the area of consumer 
protection is the establishment of a consumer education program 
that is designed to apprise citizens-particularly those who lack ade-
quate education-of their rights as consumers and to advise them 
where to go for governmental assistance before as well as when they 
have been defrauded. Studies have shown that most defrauded con-
sumers do not at present utilize the resources of the state govern-
mental agencies that are responsible for consumer protection, either 
because they are unaware of the existence of such agencies, or because 
they lack faith in the government's willingness or ability to help the 
average citizen.14 Nevertheless, although serious attempts must be 
made to convince consumers that they need not passively accept the 
economic injury inflicted upon them by dishonest merchants, it is 
:first necessary to provide a meaningful set of remedies that may be 
invoked in their behalf. It is to that initial requirement that this 
study of Michigan law is primarily directed. 
J. THE STATUTORY FRAf..iEWORK 
A. Criminal Statutes 
In most states, criminal statutes have traditionally provided the 
primary means for combatting fraudulent business practices.15 It 
has been generally conceded, however, that attacking fraud in the 
market place with criminal sanctions has been patently unsuccessful,10 
13. For a discussion of this problem, see pt. II infra. 
14. D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 175-78. It has been reported that even if de-
frauded consumers know where they may go to seek governmental assistance, nine out 
of ten will not pursue any remedy at all. Usually their distrust of all governmental 
institutions is so great that they cannot understand that help, as well as harm, can be 
received from them. See generally Murphy, Attorneys for the Poor View the U.C.C.C., 
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 298, 303-04 (1969). The author contends that the lower one's posi-
tion on the socio-economic scale, the less likely he is to be aware of the potential 
value of legal services. 
15. The primary attack on consumer fraud has been through regulation of adver-
tising, accomplished by the use of criminal statutes similar to the model act prepared 
by Printer's Ink magazine in 1911. Such statutes have been adopted in 43 states, in-
cluding Michigan. See Saxbe, supra note 10, at 901-04; Note, supra note 10, at 1058-65; 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.33 (1967); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2911.41 (Page 1962). 
Most states have also adopted criminal statutes prohibiting the obtaining of money 
and property by false pretenses. Saxbe, supra note IO at 901-02; Comment, Translating 
Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Action, 114 U. PA. L. 
REv. 395, 424-26 (1966). See Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967 
(1953); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4836 (1963). 
16. See Saxbe, The Role of Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer 
Frauds and Crimes Section of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 897, 902 
(1968); Developments in the Law-False Advertising, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1005, 1018-19, 
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and several states have abandoned that method in favor of a more 
flexible approach involving administrative remedies.17 Nevertheless 
criminal provisions are still among the primary "weapons" in the 
fight against consumer fraud in Michigan.18 The two criminal stat-
utes invoked most often19 against fraudulent merchants are the stat-
ute prohibiting false advertising20 and that prohibiting the obtaining 
of money under false pretenses.21 
The Michigan false-advertising statute prohibits placing before 
the public with the intention of selling merchandise any "untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading statement."22 Convictions under such stat-
utes have been exceedingly rare23 because of the insistence of the 
courts that there is no criminal offense absent proof that the seller 
intended to deceive, as well as to sell to, the public.24 Moreover, not 
even every intentionally misleading statement is actionable; the 
courts have decided that allowance must be made for normal "puff-
ing" of a product.215 Thus the trier of fact must in every case decide 
whether the allegedly misleading statement was merely an opinion of 
the seller which a reasonable man would have recognized as such or 
whether it was a calculated falsehood upon which a buyer could have 
reasonably relied.20 Only in the most blatant cases, therefore, have 
convictions been obtained; and even in those cases the defendant has 
generally received a suspended sentence or a fine-a small price to 
pay for operating in an illegal manner.27 
I 122-23 (1967); Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective 
Programs for Action, 114 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 395, 424-27 (1966) [hereinafter Effective Pro-
grams]. 
17. For a list of states that have enacted deceptive-practice legislation, see note 287 
infra. 
18. Interview with Jay Nolan, Chief, Fraud and Special Services Section, Wayne 
County Prosecutor's Office, Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 22, 1969 [hereinafter Nolan Inter-
view]. Consumer fraud presents one of the few instances of crime in society about 
which there is little if any public outcry. Apparently people do not mind being robbed 
with a pen. 
Criminal statutes are used in many jurisdictions. See Effective Programs, supra 
note 16, at 424-26; Letters on file at the Michigan Law Review from David S. Shannon, 
Deputy District Attorney, Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon, Oct. 10, 1969; Rob-
ert Brown, Asst. State Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit (Dade County), Florida, Oct. 
6, 1969; Eugene Gold, District Attorney, Kings County (Brooklyn), New York, Oct. 1, 
1969. 
19. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
20. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.33 (1967). 
21. MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1967). 
22. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.33 (1967). 
23. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1123. 
2•1. People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 460, 3 N .W .2d 841, 843 (1942). 
25. People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 460, 3 N.W.2d 841, 843 (1942); People v. Clarke, 
252 App. Div. 122, 297 N.Y.S. 776 (1937). 
26. People v. Austin, 301 Mich. 456, 3 N:W .2d 841 (1942). 
27. Only two decisions under this statute have been reported, and both of those 
930 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 68:926 
The statute prohibiting the obtaining of money or other property 
under false pretenses is just as ineffective. In a consumer fraud case 
arising under that provision, the state must prove the seller's intent 
to defraud, his use of a false pretense, and reliance by the purchaser 
upon that pretense.28 Furthermore, the false pretense must refer to 
an existing fact; statements concerning acts that are to take place in 
the future are not sufficient to sustain a conviction.29 Thus, for ex-
ample, if a seller tells a buyer that a watch has seventeen jewels when 
in fact it has only four, he is criminally liable; but if the seller tells 
the buyer that he will repair the watch free of charge, and then later 
refuses to do so, he is not criminally liable. Finally the defendant 
must have actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement; it is not 
enough if he is merely negligent in making the statement.30 
The strict interpretation given the false-pretenses statute, espe-
cially the requirement that the false pretense relate to an existing 
fact, severely limits the usefulness of that provision in normal con-
sumer fraud cases, such as that in which a merchant promises to 
deliver a certain article to a buyer and in fact delivers another, that 
in which the seller refuses to honor a guarantee, or that in which the 
seller makes false representations concerning the amount of future 
payments that the buyer is obligated to make or the length of time 
he has in which to make them. The obvious concern of the courts in 
restricting the scope of the statute is to prevent the criminal sanction 
from being used to enforce contractual obligations or from being 
invoked to mollify the victim of a bad bargain.31 But this policy of 
preventing criminal penalties from being used in what are essentially 
civil controversies would not be undermined by a strict provision 
making false promises actionable only in cases in which there is proof 
that the promiser, at the time the promise was made, did not intend 
to perform.32 Yet such a provision would afford the consumer more 
protection than he has under the current interpretation of the false-
pretenses statute. 
cases were prosecuted during the Second World ·war when gasoline was at a premium. 
In one of the cases, the defendant portrayed his brand of gasoline as "grade-one," 
although the jobber's manual clearly indicated that it was not. People v. Austin, l!0l 
Mich. 456, 3 N.W.2d 841 (1942). Even with the clear-cut falsehood in that case, how-
ever, prosecution and conviction may perhaps be attributed more to the strong feelings 
against war profiteering that prevailed at the time than to the fact that the case was 
an easy one for the prosecution. 
The information relating to sentencing practices was obtained in the Nolan Inter-
view, supra note 18. 
28. People v. Lee, 259 Mich. 355, 356, 24l! N.W. 227, 228 (1932). 
29. People v. Morrison, 348 Mich. 88, 91, 81 N.W.2d 667, 668 (1957). 
30. People v. Larco, 331 Mich. 420, 429, 49 N.W.2d 358, 363 (1951). 
31. See Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Saxbe, supra 
note 10, at 902. 
32. See Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 425. Indeed, in order to make their 
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However, even in the rare case in which all the elements of an 
offense under the false-pretenses statute are present, it is doubtful 
that many prosecutors will invoke the statute against businessmen 
because of the traditional hesitancy on the part of officials at all 
levels of law enforcement to apply criminal statutes to white-collar 
crimes.33 That hesitancy may be particularly pronounced with respect 
to the false-pretenses statute because of the relatively severe penalties 
attached to conviction; indeed, if the amount taken by false pretenses 
is more than one hundred dollars, the crime is a felony.34 
In addition to the false-advertising and false-pretenses statutes-
the two most commonly used consumer protection laws in Michigan 
-the state legislature has also enacted seventy-four "product stat-
utes" and seventy-six "service statutes."35 Each of these statutes pro-
hibits fraud in the sale of a specific type of goods or services, and 
each carries a criminal penalty which is enforced by one of a multi-
tude of governmental agencies ranging from the Department of 
Agriculture to the Cemetery Commission.36 These provisions, how-
ever, contribute little to the over-all fight against fraud in the market 
place. Because the power of enforcement has been delegated to so 
many disparate agencies, resources have been dissipated, coordination 
has been made impossible, and, most important, consumer access 
false-pretense statutes more functional, two states have amended their criminal codes 
to provide that false promises made with the intent not to perform are actionable. 
NEB. R.Ev. STAT, § 28-1207 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:lll-l (1969). Other states have 
reached the same result by judicial construction. See, e.g., People v. Cohn, 358 Ill. 326, 
193 N.E. 150 (1934); Commonwealth v. Green, 326 Mass. 344, 94 N.E.2d 260 (1950); 
see Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 425-26. Several recent decisions of the Michigan 
Court of Appeals have involved future promises-the failure to make good on post-
dated checks-but in each case there were also misrepresentations concerning present 
facts upon which the victim was found to have relied. See People v. Niver, 7 Mich. 
App. 652, 152 N.W.2d 714 (1967); People v. Vida, 2 Mich. App. 409, 140 N.W.2d 559 
(1966). 
33. See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1123; Effective Programs, supra 
note 16, at 426. 
34. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.218 (1967). 
35. For as complete a compilation as is presently available, see MICHIGAN CoN-
SU!lt:£RS' COUNCIL, SUM!IIARY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LEGISLATION (May 1969). 
36. E.g., ~ICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 289.501 (1967): 
[W]ithin this state no person shall manufacture, offer or expose for sale, keep in 
possession with intent to sell, or sell any ground buckwheat containing any 
product of wheat, com, rice or other foreign substance unless each and every 
package thereof be distinctly and legibly branded or labeled "Buckwheat Flour 
Compound" •••• 
Violation of this section is a misdemeanor. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 289.505 (1967). 
Similarly, the Insurance Bureau of the Department of Commerce is empowered to 
bring criminal action against any insurance broker who fraudulently obtains a renewal 
of a life insurance policy without the explicit consent of the insured. MICH. COMP. 
LAws ANN. § 500.2023 (1967). Fifty-four of these statutes attempt to control various 
fraudulent practices by specific prohibition and criminal sanction. See generally 
MICHIGAN CONSUMERi' CouNCIL, supra note 35. 
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has been inhibited.37 Moreover, by providing for only a criminal 
penalty, the legislature has denied the enforcement agencies needed 
flexibility in framing effective remedies and thus has encumbered 
the utility of the statutes. Most of these provisions could be elim-
inated with the enactment of a broad deceptive-practices statute38 
such as that proposed by the Federal Trade Commission30 or the 
Council of State Governments.40 While some details of the proposed 
acts differ, both acts place the enforcement authority in a centralized 
agency that may seek both criminal and noncriminal sanctions.41 In 
addition, both acts share a common definition of what is prohibited: 
"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."42 The advantage 
of such a broad prohibition is obvious; under it a centralized enforce-
ment agency can deal with a variety of deceptive practices that pre-
viously may have cut across various jurisdictional lines or that may 
not even have been covered by pre-existing legislation. In addition, 
the broad language offers added flexibility for dealing with new 
types of fraud and deception not prevalent at the time of enactment.43 
37. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer 
Transactions, 48 B.U. L. REv. 595, 595-600 (1968). 
38. A few of these provisions, however, although designed to prohibit fraudulent 
sales practices, deal with matters of public health or safety that should remain within 
the jurisdiction of a specialized agency. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 286.451-
.462 (1967), providing criminal penalties or injunctive relief against dealers who mis-
label toxic substances. This statute is enforced by the Department of Agriculture. 
39. FTC, UNIFORM UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION LAw [here• 
inafter FTC UNIFORM ACT], reprinted in FTC, REPORT ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM 3 (1969) [hereinafter FTC PROTECTION PROGRAM). 
40. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION, CoNSUMER PRO• 
TECTION ACT (1970 Draft) [hereinafter CSG ACT]. The National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws is also completing studies on the Uniform Consumer 
Sales Practices Act [hereinafter NCCUSL ACT]. That proposed act is now in its third 
draft. 
41. Under the FTC uniform act and the CSG act the administrator of a state 
deceptive-practices statute is to be the attorney general, whereas the NCCUSL act 
makes no recommendation as to where the centralized authority should lie. With 
regard to the FTC proposed act, see FTC PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note 39, at• 
tachment A, at C. (1968). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 2, 4, 5 (Supp. 
1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-7 (Supp. 1953). A few states have placed consumer 
protection programs in another regulatory agency. See, e.g., CONN. G.E;N. STAT. ANN. 
§ 42-111-ll5a (Supp. 1969) (Commissioner of Consumer Protection). 
42. Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1964). This language 
has been incorporated into § 2 of the FTC Uniform Act and into § 2, alternative I, of 
the proposed CSG act. For those states not wishing to repeal present unfair-competi-
tion laws, the CSG act, § 2, alternative 2, also defines prohibited conduct as simply 
"[f]alse, misleading, or deceptive acts or _practices in the conduct of any trade of com-
merce •••. " 
43. Some states have adopted language similar or identical to that of the existing 
Federal Trade Commission Act (see note 42 supra). E.g., HAWAII REv. LAws § 205A-l.l 
(Supp. 1965); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 19.86.020 (Supp. 1968). This language requires the state courts and the administrator 
of the state legislation to draw heavily upon decisions construing the Federal Trade 
April 1970) Comments 933 
The Attorney General of Michigan has urged the adoption of such 
legislation;44 but the attitude of the legislature, although it has 
changed from "hostility to cool approval,''45 does not foreshadow 
quick passage. In the meantime, dishonest merchants who prey upon 
poor consumers can find comfort in the knowledge that they are 
better off than the Mafia; they do not have to pay bribes. 
B. Civil Statutes Regulating Retail Sales 
The first comprehensive civil statute regulating retail sales was 
enacted in Indiana in 1935.46 Michigan followed soon thereafter with 
the enactment in 1939 of the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales 
Act.-¼7 But unlike the Indiana statute, which had a broad scope, the 
Michigan statute regulated merely the form of the contract to be 
used in an installment sale of an automobile, requiring the inclusion 
of a statement of the cash price, the amount of the down payment, 
the amount of any unpaid balance, and the amount of finance 
charges.48 That Act remained the only retail-sales regulation in 
Michigan until 1951 when the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act 
was adopted.49 During the decade of the fifties, many state legislatures 
enacted comprehensive retail-sales legislation.50 The Michigan legis-
lature, however, lagged behind until 1966 when it passed the Retail 
Commission Act. A provision both in the suggested CSG act [§ 3(b)] and NCCUSL act 
(§§ 4b, 9) goes further, however, and requires that any rules or regulations issued by 
the state administrator be in conformity with such decisions. Although the state ad-
ministrator should avoid conflicts between state and federal law as much as possible, 
there does not seem to be any compelling reason to limit the authority of the state 
to provide greater protection to its citizens. In the event that a standard less stringent 
than the federal provision is adopted by the state, the consumer would still have the 
higher level of protection under the federal act from interstate deceptive activities. 
Still, the availability of federal legislation should not preclude the states from ex-
perimenting with increased regulation if current measures are not sufficient. For 
example, a state could insist that retail merchants not use "list prices" in advertising 
goods unless those prices are, in fact, the normal prices at which the goods are sold. 
This requirement would probably greatly help the consumer in assessing the true 
value of a so-called discount or sale price. It seems, however, that the doctrine of 
compatibility with FTC decisions would prohibit such a requirement since the FTC 
has established a lesser standard. See Baum, The Consumer and the Federal Trade 
Commission, 44 J. URBAN LAW 71, 81-82 (1966). 
44. Interview with George Platsis, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Con-
sumer Protection Division, Michigan Attorney General's Office, Lansing, Michigan, 
Oct. 7, 1969 [hereinafter Platsis Interview]. 
45. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E., at 1, col. 4. 
46. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 58-902 to -934 (1961); see Note, Retail Installm,mt Sales Leg-
islation, 58 CoLtJM. L. REv. 854, 856 (1958). 
47. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN,§§ 566.301-.302 (1967). 
48. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 566.302 (1967). 
49. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 492.101-.138 (1967). 
50. See Hogan, A Survey of State Installment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 
(1958). 
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Installment Sales Act51 which is an all-goods statute.62 During the 
same session, the legislature enacted the Home Improvement Finance 
Act regulating the form of home improvement contracts which are 
for services having a value exceeding three hundred dollars.58 
These Michigan statutes, like almost all retail-sales legislation in 
the United States, are basically disclosure-oriented and for the most 
part do not rigorously regulate the substantive content and the con-
ditions of retail-sales agreements.54 The Retail Installment Sales Act, 
for example, requires that all installment contracts be in ·writing and 
contain a notice to the buyer in at least eight-point type that he is 
entitled to a copy of the contract, that he should not sign the contract 
if it contains any blank spaces, and that he is entitled to a partial 
return of the finance charge if the balance is prepaid.55 The Motor 
Vehicle Sales Finance Act and the Home Improvement Finance Act 
contain similar provisions and basically do not go much beyond the 
requirement that pertinent information be disclosed on the face of 
motor vehicle sales contracts and home improvement contracts.56 The 
state statutory requirements for disclosure of financing terms in in-
stallment contracts have been superseded by the Federal Consumer 
Credit Protection Act;57 and the Michigan legislature has stipulated 
that the federal standards, which include the requirement that the 
seller furnish the installment buyer with a statement of the annual 
percentage rate of finance charges, are absorbed into the present 
51. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.851-.872 (1967). 
52. For a comprehensive compilation of both all-goods and limited-purpose state 
legislation, see B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION, chart II, at 254-55, 
chart 17, at 293-300, chart 19, at 312-22 (1965). 
53. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1101-.1431 (1967). 
54. Hogan, supra note 50, at 44-47; Note, Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 58 
CoLuM. L. REv. 854, 866-72 (1958); see B. CURRAN, supra note 52, chart 17, at 293-300. 
There is a considerable difference between regulating the manner in which substantive 
terms are presented to the buyer and regulating the terms themselves. The retail-sales 
acts, for instance, require the sales price to be disclosed but do not place any limit 
upon that sales price, which could be done with an unconscionability clause. See 
NCCUSL Acr § 2(c); Note, Inadequacy of Consideration as a Factor in Determining 
Unconscionability Under Section 2-302 of the UCC, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1248 (1969). The 
greatest failing of retail-sales legislation, however, is that it does not deal at all with 
the inducements for the sale or with the negotiations before the siguing of the contract. 
This precontract stage is crucial; once the consumer has assented, the signing itself is 
a mere formality. 
55. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.853(a) (1967). 
56. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN._§§ 445.1202(b), 492.ll2(d) (1967). In addition to estab-
lishing· disclosure requiiements,' the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act provides that all 
persons engaged in the selling of motor vehicles under installment sales contracts, as 
well as the financial institutions taking assignments of such contracts, must be licensed 
by the state. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.103 (1967). ·The Act vests authority in the 
Financial Institutions Bureau to grant such licenses. See text accompanying notes 227-34 
infra. 
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1631-41 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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Michigan regulatory scheme.58 For all practical purposes, the Michi-
gan statutes, combined with the Federal Act, provide for the dis-
closure of virtually all the information that is relevant to the con-
sumer who is purchasing goods on an installment basis. A significant 
question remains, however, as to whether the disclosure provisions 
actually protect the average consumer in the market place. 
In order to answer that question, it is necessary to understand the 
purposes which disclosure provisions are intended to serve. Basically, 
disclosure statutes attempt to provide buyers on the credit market 
with the opportunity to compare the credit terms of various sellers; 
they do so in order to assist the consumer in obtaining the best bar-
gain and thereby to reduce the possibility that the buyer will be 
victimized by an unscrupulous merchant. Theoretically, such statutes 
could be of assistance to relatively sophisticated middle- and upper-
class buyers, who are able to understand the financial information 
presented in installment contracts and loan agreements, and who 
are able to choose freely among the various credit merchants because 
they off er merchants a low credit risk. 59 Most of these sophisticated 
consumers, however, are aware that it is cheaper to borrow money 
from a bank or to buy from a reputable merchant than it is to borrow 
from a sales finance company or to buy from an "easy credit" mer-
chant. For these consumers, then, the disclosure provisions, which 
are aimed at high-priced finance companies and unscrupulous mer-
chants, may as a practical matter be of little use.60 
Poor and uneducated lower-class consumers, on the other hand, 
lack the ability to understand the disclosed financial information 
and are thus unable to shop comparatively in the credit market.61 
In addition, they suffer from gullibility fostered in part by ignorance 
and in part by the desire to compensate for a secondary position in 
society by purchasing material goods.62 Moreover, most poor urban 
58. No. 30, [1969] Mich. Acts 69-70 (to be codified in MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 445.lll); No. 31, [1969] Mich. Acts 70 (to be codified in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 445.851); No. 35, [1969] Mich. Acts 77 (to be codified in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 492.122). 
59. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 
4-5 (1969); Note, Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 746-54 (1967). 
60. Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM. 
L. RE\'. 445, 455-69 (1968); Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. I, 4-5 (1969). The latter article is an excellent answer to those who 
believe disclosure is the cure-all for consumer credit problems. For a more favorable 
view of disclosure statutes, see Jordon & ·warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A 
Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285 (1966). It should also be mentioned that today much 
purchasing is done with all-purpose credit cards. It is doubtful that the interest 
charges of such cards enter into the consumer's decision whether to use them instead of 
a loan or other form of financing. 
61. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MORE 13-15 (1967). 
62. See Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 883, 917-19 (1969); D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 12-13. 
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consumers have little desire and even less ability to shop in stores 
outside the ghetto;63 their generally poor credit ratings all but pre-
clude the possibility of their receiving credit in stores catering to the 
middle and upper classes.64 Finally, the poor consumer seldom shops 
for credit separately from the purchase of goods. As a consequence, 
the retail merchant dealing with poor consumers also provides financ-
ing and is able to conceal finance charges in the selling price and thus 
to offer very attractive, but deceptive, credit terms.65 
The primary weakness of disclosure-oriented retail-sales statutes, 
therefore, is that they are not designed to combat the evils that 
beset the poor, inner-city consumer. Deceptive sales practices, un-
scrupulous merchants, and exorbitant prices and credit terms are 
facts of life in the ghetto-but not in the shopping centers of the 
suburbs. Yet the disclosure statutes are designed so that only educated 
and economically prosperous consumers can benefit from them. Per-
haps the greatest danger in such legislation is not that it fails to 
provide a solution to consumer fraud problems, but that enough 
people will think that it does provide a solution that any further 
reform will be precluded . 
.Although most retail-sales legislation is disclosure-oriented, the 
statutes in many states, including Michigan, do attempt some regula-
tion of certain sales practices that are particularly harsh upon con-
sumers. 66 The practices receiving the most statutory attention are the 
various cut-off devices by which financial institutions, as assignees 
of consumer obligations, can avoid the consumer's claims and defenses 
which arise out of the original sale and which are raised in actions 
to compel the consumer to pay the amount due on the sales contract. 
The holder-in-due-course doctrine is one such device. The doc-
trine allows the assignee of a consumer obligation to compel the 
consumer to satisfy that obligation, but it does not subject the 
63. See FTC CREnrr STUDY, supra note 5, at 42-45, in which it was found that 70% 
of the customers of low-income (ghetto) retailers never purchase on credit from other 
than a low-income retailer. This statistic is significant in light of the fact that most 
low-income consumers can purchase only on credit. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, 
at 14-15. 
64. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MORE 98 (1967); Note, Consumer Legislation and 
the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745, 757 (1967). 
65. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, supra note 60, at 6-7. 
Since mark-ups are so much higher in the ghetto (see FTC CREDIT STUDY, supra note 
5, at 25-28), and since the poor have little opportunity to be exposed to a different 
price structure, there is much more flexibility in the list prices, and additional credit 
charges may be absorbed without significant competitive disadvantage. The require-
ments of federal and state disclosure statutes can be easily met since no concealment of 
the actual finance charge is involved; no disclosure statute prohibits a merchant from 
raising the selling price rather than credit charges. 
66. See generally Hogan, supra note 50; MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.853, .864, 
.1203, 492.114(b) (1967). See also MICHIGAN CONSUMER'S COUNCIL, COMPARISON OF THE 
uccc WITH MICHIGAN CREDIT LEGISLATION table 4, at 15-18 (Aug. 1969). 
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assignee to the claims-such as failure of consideration, fraud, or 
breach of warranty-that the consumer may have against the mer-
chant who contracted with him for the sale of the goods. In the 
typical installment sale, the buyer executes a promissory note to the 
seller in conjunction with the sales contract. In order to meet cur-
rent capital needs, many merchants sell both the note and the con-
tract to a finance company or bank.67 Under article 3 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), if the assignee purchases the instrument 
for value, in good faith, and without notice of any defense or claim, 
the assignee is a holder in due course68 and as such is not subject 
to the defenses or claims of the consumer which arise out of the 
sale.60 The drafters of the UCC, in an attempt to preserve the free 
transferability of commercial paper, adopted a "subjective" standard 
which requires that the assignee have actual knowledge of a claim or 
defense in order for him to be denied holder status.7° Courts in 
some states, however, recognizing the harshness of this test, have held 
that when there is a "close connection" between the seller and the 
assignee-such as when the finance company provides forms for the 
negotiable instrument and approves the terms of the sale71 or when 
there is duplication of management between the seller and assignee72 
-the subsequent purchaser must be denied holder status.73 The 
67. The assignee is then able to enforce the contract for the balance due, to en-
force the security agreement and obtain possession of the goods, or to do both. This 
process is examined in Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective 
Goods, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 782, 783-85 (1954). There is some conflicting evidence con-
cerning the e.xtent to which the holder-in-due-course doctrine is a real problem. The 
FTC CREDIT STUDY, supra note 5, reported that low-income retailers assigned only 
20% of their paper. The Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau, on the other hand, 
estimates that over 90% of automobile purchase contracts and notes are assigned by 
dealers and that a large percentage of paper generated by other retailers, with the 
exception of department stores, is assigned as well. Interview with Alvin J. Trierweiler, 
Director, Consumer Finance Division, Financial Institutions Bureau, Department of 
Commerce, Lansing, Michigan, Oct. 14, 1969 [hereinafter Trierweiler Interview]. See 
note 112 infra. Most poverty lawyers feel that the doctrine is a principal obstacle to 
combatting fraud. See Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the U.C.C.C., 44 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 298 (1969). 
68. UNIFORM COM!IIERCIAL CODE, § 3-302 [hereinafter UCC]. 
69. ucc § 3-305. 
70. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the 
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 63-65 (1966). 
71. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 
771, 214 P.2d 819, 822 (1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953). 
72. See United States v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940) (assignee of the 
note was a wholly owned subsidiary of the assignor); Toms v. Nugent, 12 S.2d 713 
(La. App. 1943) (finance company wholly owned by the president of the company 
which had sold an automobile to the defendant). 
73. For discussions of this subject, see Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due 
Course of Commercial Paper, 1958 WASH. U. L.Q. 177; Jordan&: Warren, The U.C.C.C., 
68 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 387, 434 nn.131-32 (1968); Littlefield, supra note 70; Murphy, An-
other "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-
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theory of these decisions is that holder status must be denied either 
because the transfer was not made in good faith74 or because the 
financial institution is so related to the seller that it is reasonable to 
consider the institution a party to the original transaction.75 Other 
courts have gone even further and have held that under certain 
circumstances-such as when the financial institution has knowledge 
of a dealer's poor business reputation76 or of his fraudulent business 
practices77-the institution must be charged with "objective notice" 
of any defenses available to the consumer that would have been 
discovered by a reasonable investigation. Under this theory, the 
institution acquiring the consumer's obligation is liable to the ex-
tent of any of the buyer's claims which are based upon the original 
transaction.78 These decisions have not been universally accepted, 
however, and many courts have rejected any deviation from the 
actual-knowledge standard envisioned by the Code.70 Michigan seems 
to have adopted the latter course;80 hence the consumer can probably 
of-Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 667 (1968); Comment, Consumer 
Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 
505. 
74. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 1~7 S.W.2d 260 (1940); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 
(1950); Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Unico v. Owen, 2!12 A.2d 
405, 50 N.J. 101 (1967); see Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut•Off 
Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 514. 
75. Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S:W.2d 260 (1940); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 
(1950); see Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer 
Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 514. 
76. Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J. Super. 575, 590-91, 181 A.2d 809, 818 
(1962). 
77. Norman v. World Wide Distrib., Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 58-59, 195 A.2d 115, 
118 (1963); Jaeger &: Branch, Inc. v. Pappas, 20 Utah 2d 100, 433 P.2d 605 (1967). 
See also Local Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade, 361 S.W .2d 830 (Mo. 1962), in which the 
court held that knowledge and approval by the finance company of the seller's general 
practice of using chattel mortgages and promissory notes contemporaneously with 
sales contracts was sufficient to deny holder-in-due-course status to the finance company. 
The court rejected the idea that knowledge of the specific note and sales contract was 
needed. 
78. Such decisions are not in accord with the standard set by the draftsmen of the 
UCC, but they represent the judicial distaste for the various cut-off devices, at least 
when consumers are involved. See Littlefield, supra note 70. 
79. E.g., Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Janzewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); 
Buchett v. Allied Concord Fin., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P .2d 186 (1964). See also Jordan &: 
Warren, supra note 73, at 434; Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor Ori-
ented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. 445, 469 (1968). 
80. The Michigan courts have held that actual knowledge of a claim or defense is 
necessary before holder-in-due-course status will be denied. Alropa Corp. v. King's 
Estate, 279 Mich. 418, 272 N.W. 728 (1937); Muskegon Citizen's Loan &: Inv. Co. v. 
Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 241 N.W. 135 (1932). The purchaser is under no duty to 
inquire as to possible defenses unless, from something appearing on the face of the 
instrument or from something actually communicated to the purchaser, the failure to 
investigate would amount to "bad faith." King v. C.B. Todd &: Sons, 310 Mich. 181, 16 
April 1970] Comments 939 
expect little help from the courts when he is sued by an assignee 
of his contract or note and seeks to interpose, as a defense, claims 
he has against the seller which have arisen out of the sale. 
Even if the financial institution is denied holder status, however, 
it may employ another cut-off device-the waiver-of-defense clause 
-in an effort to preclude the consumer from asserting defenses. 
Such clauses are inserted in retail-sales contracts and usually stipulate 
that the buyer agrees not to assert any claims arising out of the sale 
against any assignee of the contract. 81 The courts of some states have 
recognized waiver-of-defense clauses as being an unfair imposition 
upon a purchaser of consumer goods and have therefore held such 
clauses to be contrary to public policy.82 In those states, the enforce-
ment of the clauses has been denied. In most states, however, the 
courts have upheld waiver-of-defense clauses as valid contractual pro-
visions, cutting off the buyer's claims against an assignee of the 
sales contract.83 The issue of the validity of waiver-of-defense clauses 
has never been directly faced by the courts in Michigan; but since 
the Michigan legislature has placed some limitations upon the use 
of such clauses,84 there is reason to believe that the courts will not 
trench upon legislative ground and extend the consumers' right any 
further. Such a policy of judicial passiveness would be in keeping 
N.W.2d 709 (1945); Muskegon Citizen's Loan & Inv. Co. v. Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 
2·U N.W. 135 (1932). The test is the subjective intent of the purchaser, and mere 
negligence, or even gross negligence, in making the purchase will not be sufficient if 
bad faith is not shown. King v. C.B. Todd & Sons, 310 Mich. 181, 16 N.W.2d 709 
(1945); Hakes v. Thayer, 165 Mich. 476, 131 N.W. 174 (1911); Armstrong v. Stearns, 156 
Mich. 597, 121 N.W. 312 (1909). Most of these cases were decided under the Negotiable 
Instruments Law, the predecessor of the UCC provisions, as were most of the cases in 
other jurisdictions. See cases cited in notes 71, 74-77 supra. The Michigan appellate 
courts have not passed upon this issue since the adoption of the UCC in 1964, but 
there is nothing in article III of the UCC that would appear to mandate a different 
result. See Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the 
Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REv. 48, 49-50, 53-60, 74-77 (1966); Note, Unico v. Owen: 
Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course Under the U.C.C., 54 VA. L. 
R.Ev. 279, 284-92 (1968). The validity of the "close-connection" test as a measure of 
good faith or notice is similarly unresolved by the Michigan courts. 
81. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. IOI, 107, 232 A.2d 405, 408 (1967), in which the 
court stated that the purpose of a sales contract containing such a clause is to 
get the most and give the least. Overall it includes a multitude of conditions, 
stipulations, reservations, exceptions, and waivers skillfully devised to restrict the 
liability of the seller within the narrowest limits, and to leave no avenue of 
escape from liability on the part of the purchaser. 
82. See, e.g., American Natl. Bank v. Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 P. 376 (1923); 
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. IOI, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Quality Fin. Co. v. Hurley, 337 
Mass. 150, 148 N.E.2d 385 (1958). These decisions are consistent with UCC § 9-206(1). 
That provision, while generally upholding the use of waiver clauses, stipulates that a 
different rule may be established for consumer sales. The decisions are also consistent 
with UCC § 2-302, which prohibits the enforcement of unconscionable clauses. 
83. E.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Biagi, 11 Ill. App. 2d 80, 136 N.E.2d 580 
(1956); National City Bank v. Prospect Syndicate, Inc., 170 Misc. 611, 10 N.Y.S.2d 759 
(1939); Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223, 211 P. 991 (1922). 
8·1. See text accompanyin)? notes 92-95 infra. 
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with the traditional reluctance of Michigan courts to take action -in 
the consumer protection area. 86 
The harshness to the consumer of the holder-in-due-course doc-
trine or the waiver-of-defense clause has caused many state legis-
latures, including Michigan's, to restrict the use of those devices to 
cut off the consumer's claims or defenses. Several states, through their 
all-goods retail-sales statutes or through special legisltaion,86 have 
withdrawn holder status from financial institutions in cases in which 
the institutions purchase consumer paper. The Michigan Home Im-
provement Finance Act accomplishes essentially the same result by 
providing that no negotiable instrument may be executed with a 
home improvement contract.87 The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, 
however, contains no limitations upon the use of commercial paper in 
automobile installment sales and thus leaves the provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code unchanged.88 The Retail Installment 
Sales Act allows a negotiable note to be executed in conjunction with 
an installment contract; but it provides that an assignment of the 
note, even if made to an institution which qualifies as a holder in 
due course, does not bar the buyer from raising a defense against 
the institution unless a written notice of the assignment is mailed 
to the buyer and he fails to notify the institution of a claim within 
fifteen days.89 
There have been similar legislative responses with regard to 
waiver-of-defense clauses, and almost all recent changes either pro-
hibit90 or limit91 the use of such clauses. In Michigan, the Retail 
Installment Sales Act prohibits waiver clauses entirely;92 while under 
the Home Improvement Finance Act such clauses are valid only if 
the assignee notifies the buyer that there has been an assignment, 
and receives no notice of any claims of the buyer within fifteen days 
85. See text accompanying note 186 infra. 
86. See Cal. Retail Installment Sales Act, CAL. C1v. CODE § 1803.2(a) (West Supp. 
1970); Md. Retail Installment Sales Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1957); N.Y. 
PERS. PROP. LAW § 403(1) (McKinney Supp. 1969); UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 
§ 2.403. See also Murphy, supra note 73, 673-74, 678-84 &: n.23. 
87. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1207(1) (1967). If a promissory note is executed 
to the dealer, it must contain a notice that it is subject to the terms of the executory 
home improvement contract. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 445.1207 (1967). 
88. See note 68 supra. 
89. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.865(d) (1967). 
90. Alas. Retail Installment Sales Act, ALAS. STAT. § 45.140 (1962); Conn. Home 
Solicitation Sales Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-136 to -143 (Supp. 1968); Hawaii Retail 
Installment Sales Act, HAWAII REv. LAWS § 201A-17(d) (Supp. 1967); see Murphy, supra 
note 73, 678-84. 
91. N.Y. Retail Installment Sales Act, N.Y. PERS. PROP. I.Aw § 403(1) (McKinney 
Supp. 1969); Pa. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 615 (1965); 
see UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.404. 
92. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.864(£) (1967). 
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thereafter.98 The Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act also prohibits 
waiver clauses,94 but stipulates that this provision does not affect 
the rights of a holder in due course.815 
The Michigan statutory provisions relating to cut-off devices 
contribute little to reducing the harsh effects of those devices upon 
poor and uneducated consumers. Under all three acts, it is possible, 
either through the use of the traditional holder-in-due-course doctrine 
or through meeting a notice requirement, to deprive a buyer of his 
defenses. The notice requirement, while in theory protecting an un-
educated consumer against a cut-off of his defenses, does not seem 
in practice to have that effect, since such consumers are not likely 
to comprehend the significance of the notice from the finance com-
pany.116 Moreover, even if the consumer does understand that he must 
notify the financial institution of his claims in order to preserve his 
right of action, he may still not be protected, since in many cases 
claims do not arise until after the fifteen-day statutory period for 
giving notice of assignment.07 
In light of the weaknesses of the current statutory scheme, the 
Michigan Attorney General and most poverty la'wyers feel that all 
cut-off devices should be eliminated in consumer sales.98 The argu-
men.ts in support of this position are strong.09 Perhaps most significant 
is the contention that the elimination of cut-off devices would bring 
the reality of consumer transactions into line with consumer expec-
tations, enabling consumers to exercise their most potent self-help 
weapon-refusal to pay-against assignees of their obligations. In 
addition, advocates of eliminating cut-off devices point out that the 
policy of making commercial paper unconditionally transferable was 
originally intended to facilitate negotiations among merchants for 
whom freely transferable notes were an essential form of currency.100 
This policy, the consumer advocates stress, does not justify the use 
of cut-off devices in normal retail sales in which instruments are 
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1206(a), .1208 (1967), 
94. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.114(£) (1967). 
95. MICH. CoMP. LA.ws ANN. § 492.114(£) (1967). 
96. Murphy, supra note 67, at 320; Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 400; Com-
ment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 
1968 WIS. L, REv. 505, 521. 
97. Some defenses, such as that of fraud, may well exist when the notice is re-
ceived, But others, especially breach of warranty, may not arise until months, or even 
years, after the time period for notification has elapsed. 
98. Platsis Interview, supra note 44; Interview with Vincent Donnelly, Staff At-
torney, Neighborhood Legal Services, Detroit, Michigan, Aug. 21, 1969 [hereinafter 
Donnelly Interview]. 
99. Murphy, supra note 73, at 674 n.24. 
100. Littlefield, supra note 70; Murphy, supra note 73, at 672. 
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rarely negotiated beyond the first assignment.101 Another argument 
favoring the elimination of cut-off devices is that financial institutions 
are better able to absorb the losses arising out of dealer misbehavior-
by increasing credit rates, by expanding operations, or by purchasing 
insurance-than are individual consumers.102 Moreover, the argu-
ment runs, a small rise in the cost of credit would be justified by the 
benefits resulting from the elimination of cut-off devices, particularly 
since those increases would be distributed among a large number of 
consumers, not only among the poor consumers most likely to be 
victimized by dishonest merchants. A final argument is that since 
much financing of consumer transactions is characterized by rela-
tively close ties between the dealer and the financial institution,103 
the institution is in a much better position than is the consumer, 
and perhaps even the state, to control dealer practices.104 As a matter 
of policy, therefore, it may be worthwhile to tap that source of 
control by motivating financial institutions to become watchdogs of 
consumer interests out of concern for the security of their mm in-
vestments. 
As a practical matter, however, it must be recognized that not 
all of the changes which will result from a prohibition of cut-off 
devices will be favorable to the public-especially the poor consumer. 
For example, an elimination of cut-off devices might motivate fi-
nancial institutions to establish stricter security arrangements with 
dealers in order to offset the increased risks of purchasing the dealers' 
consumer paper without the protection of the cut-off devices.105 The 
net effect of such a change would be to increase the dealers' cost 
of doing business and thus to increase his prices to consumers.106 
101. A finance company, after purchasing consumer paper, may assign it to a bank 
as security for a loan, but this paper is not freely negotiated between merchants as a 
method of payment. 
102. Littlefield, Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New 
UCCC, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 272, 294 (1969). 
103. Littlefield, supra note 70, at 63-64. 
104. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 280-86; Murphy, supra note 67, at 320; Effective 
Programs, supra note 16, at 417-18; see Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 S.2d 649 (Fla. 
1953). 
105. Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 418; Note, A Case Study of the Impact 
of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 
78 YALE L.J. 618, 640·41 (1969); see Vernon, Priorities, the UCC, and Consumer Financ-
ing, 4 B.C. IND. &: COM. L. R.Ev. 531, 547 (1964). 
106. Some advocates of the use of cut-off devices have argued that an elimination 
of such devices would probably motivate financial institutions to attempt to return 
the risk of default to the dealer either through a dealer reserve fund or through an 
agreement by which the dealer agrees to repurchase the assigned paper if it is defec-
tive. See note 105 supra. Such a change would clearly increase the dealers' cost of 
doing business. In Michigan, however, that argument is inapposite since most Michigan 
financial institutions purchasing consumer paper already use either reserve funds or 
repurchase agreements. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67; Interview with Professor 
William J. Pierce, Executive Secretary, NCCUSL, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Feb. 27, 1970. 
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Moreover, while an elimination of cut-off devices might motivate 
financial institutions to undertake more detailed investigations of 
dealers,107 such investigations would probably focus on the ability 
of the merchant to meet its financial obligations-including, for ex-
ample, any repurchase agreements-rather than on the merchant's 
business ethics.108 The financial institution would be primarily con-
cerned with the risk involved in purchasing the dealer's commercial 
paper; and the risk factor that is related to any particular transaction 
is a matter of economics, not morality, especially when the seller 
agrees to repurchase the paper or to reimburse the assignee if any 
defects in the paper are uncovered. Although such investigations 
would help to eradicate the problem of undercapitalized dealers 
that are prone to become insolvent, the investigations would do little 
to protect the consumer from a prosperous but dishonest merchant.109 
Another possible institutional response to an elimination of cut-
off devices-and perhaps an even more damaging one to low-income 
consumers-is for financial institutions to discontinue their indirect 
financing of consumer sales through the purchase of consumer paper, 
and instead to place more emphasis upon making of direct loans to 
consumers.110 Retail dealers, particularly those regarded as poor risks 
by the financial community, would then be faced with the alter-
natives of either financing their own installment sales or relying ex-
clusively upon cash sales.111 If dealers were to adopt the former 
Nevertheless, increased costs to the dealer would still result if financial institutions, 
because of a greater number of consumer suits or because of the fear of such suits, 
were to require a larger percentage of the contract value or the value of a promissory 
note executed in conjunction with the contract to be placed in the reserve fund. Of 
course, if such increases in the amount of the reserve fund were not demanded of all 
merchants, but only of those merchants who engage in dishonest practices and whose 
paper is thus defective, then reputable merchants would not be hurt. If a repurchase 
agreement is used, on the other hand, the entire cost of dishonest sales practices would 
be shifted back to the merchant who committed those practices, unless the merchant 
is financially unable to repurchase his defective paper. The financial institution could 
protect itself against the possibility of insolvent dealers by accepting paper only from 
l1ighly capitalized merchants. Unfortunately, however, this practice would not dis-
criminate between smaller merchants who are honest and therefore present few risks 
and merchants who use deceptive practices and thus present a high probability of 
consumer suits. Tims some reputable small merchants would be forced to undertake 
their own financing or else to go out of business. In the former case, consumers would 
face increased prices, and in the latter, they would have fewer merchants with whom 
to deal. See note ll0 infra. 
107. Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination 
of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 639 (1969). 
108. Id. 
109. See Murphy, supra note 67, at 280 n.29. 
ll0. See Comment, Consumer Protection-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Con-
sumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 525; Note, A Case Study of the Impact of 
Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 
78 YALE L.J. 618, 642 (1969). 
111. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 272-73, 292-93; Note, A Case Study of the Impact 
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course and finance their own installment sales, the consequences to 
the consumer would be increased prices or finance charges-partic-
ularly in ghetto areas-because the dealer would have to absorb 
the losses resulting from uncollectible accounts and from other costs 
of administering installment contracts, and because he would have to 
do so without the expertise and loss-spreading capabilities of financial 
institutions. In addition, there would be greater likelihood of dealer 
insolvency.112 
Because of the demands upon capital which are imposed by in-
stallment financing, however, it is probable that few merchants would 
be able to afford to make installment sales unless they had the 
opportunity to sell their commercial paper to institutional pur-
chasers.113 Thus most retail dealers would turn to a greater use of 
cash sales, thereby increasing the incidence of direct lending from 
banks and finance companies to consumers. For poor consumers, 
this shift would probably lead to a decreased ability to purchase 
goods because of their general inability to obtain credit other than 
from retailers catering to low-income buyers.114 But even if such 
consumers were able to obtain loans, they would lose the benefits of 
the elimination of cut-off devices, since the loan from the bank or 
finance company would not be tied to any purchase; the buyer would 
be required to repay the loan even if he was defrauded by a dealer. 
Furthermore, many poverty lawyers are fearful that increased reli-
ance by dealers upon cash sales, coupled with more direct lending by 
financial institutions, would result in the development of a "referral" 
system whereby the lender accepts customers referred to him by the 
dealer.115 Under such a scheme, both the dealer and the lender would 
of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off 
Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 642-46 (1969). 
112. Even large department stores, which regularly finance all installment sales 
themselves, report that their credit operations produce a net loss. But the ratio of the 
loss to gross credit sales increases as the size of the store decreases. NATIONAL RETAIL 
MERCHANTS AssN., ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPARTMENT STORE CREDIT 51-52 
(1969). Small, low-income retailers who operate closer to the legal limit on interest 
charges and depend much more on installment sales than do large retailers would be 
less able to undertake financing operations themselves. Any increased costs would, 
of course, be passed on to the consumer, probably in the form of higher prices. See 
FTC CREDIT STUDY, supra note 5, at 5, 26-27. Also, the smaller merchants, in order to 
maintain a flow of capital, would either have to take out loans themselves, which 
might not be feasible, or to reduce the time period for payment on installment sales 
from several years to several months. Either way the poor consumer is harmed. 
113. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 274; Note, supra note 104, at 644-45. 
114. See notes 63, 106 supra. This inability to obtain credit may not be an entirely 
undesirable consequence, since many poor consumers do purchase items that they do 
not need or cannot afford. Unfortunately, however, this restriction also prevents the 
poor from purchasing goods that are useful or necessary. 
115. Littlefield, supra note 102, at 272-73, 292-93; Murphy, Another "Assault Upon 
the Citadel"-Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses 
in Consumer Sales, 29 Omo ST. L.J. 667, 687 (1968). See also Note, supra note 10-!, at 
645. 
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profit at the buyer's expense-the dealer by obtaining a cash sale 
and the lender by obtaining an absolute obligation on the part of 
the buyer to repay the loan.116 
The problem of deciding what to do about cut-off devices is 
compounded by the lack of empirical data demonstrating the actual 
costs and benefits that will result from any given course of action. 
A careful analysis of the pros and cons of cut-off devices from the 
standpoint of the consumer, however, suggests that elimination of 
those devices should be favored because of the likelihood that the 
benefits of elimination will outweigh the disadvantages.117 After an 
initial period of overreaction in the finance industry, the added risks 
of financing without the benefit of cut-off devices would probably be 
spread among the various parties involved in consumer sales and in 
consumer finance, and the extreme burden previously placed upon 
the defrauded consumer whose obligation is purchased by a financial 
institution would be removed. It also seems reasonable to assume 
that, without cut-off devices, dealers experiencing a high percentage 
of complaints from buyers would find it more difficult and more 
expensive to sell commercial paper to financial institutions and would 
find it more costly to remain in business,118 Eliminating cut-off de-
vices therefore may tend to weed out at least the most blatant per-
petrators of fraud in the market place. If referral schemes between 
merchants and lenders become a serious problem, that problem can 
be dealt with either by new legislation119 or by an extension of the 
"single transaction" doctrine which denies holder-in-due-course status 
to financial institutions when the institution and the merchant have 
a "close connection."120 On balance, then, a complete elimination of 
cut-off devices seems desirable. That elimination could be best ac-
complished through an all-inclusive deceptive-practices statute,121 
116. The loan, under current theory at least, would not be conditional even if the 
merchant accompanied the consumer to the finance company, and the company ap-
proved. There is also the possibility that an increase in the ri~k of sales to low-income 
consumers would exert pressure on dealers to obtain greater sales volume and could 
lead to an increase in the use of fraudulent or high-pressure sales tactics. 
117. In at least one state, New Mexico, there is evidence that elimination of cut-off 
devices has not made any appreciable difference in the ability of low-income consumers 
to purchase on credit. See Felsenfeld, Some Ruminations About Remedies in Consumer 
Credit Transactions, 8 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 535, 551-52 (1967). With a rational 
allocation of risks, the result of the elimination of cut-off devices should be the same 
in Michigan. See also Note, supra note 105, at 655-56; Comment, Consumer Protection 
-The Role of Cut-Off Devices in Consumer Financing, 1968 WIS. L. REv. 505, 525. 
118. See Note, supra note 104, at 645-50. 
119. For a suggested solution, see Littlefield, supra note 102, at 293-96. 
120. See Littlefield, supra note 102, at 286-97; text accompanying notes 71-78 supra. 
121. Section 9 of the CSG act, supra note 40, contains a provision which eliminates 
all cut-off devices in consumer sales. In addition, the act allows a consumer to main-
tain an affirmative action against the assignee; although the consumer cannot recover 
an amount greater than the amount owed to the assignee, he is not limited to a simple 
set-off. This provision gives the consumer a way to avoid harassment or loss of credit 
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rather than through limited-purpose acts such as those that are in 
effect to some degree in Michigan.122 A comprehensive provision 
would eliminate gaps in coverage and would contribute to the de-
velopment of an integrated statutory framework to deal with con-
sumer fraud problems. 
Apart from the regulation of cut-off devices, the statutes of many 
states contain provisions that afford a consumer the opportunity to 
rescind a sales contract during a designated period of time after the 
contract is executed.123 In Michigan, only one statute contains such 
a "cooling-off" provision-the Home Improvement Finance Act.124 
That statute allows a buyer, for any reason, to rescind a home im-
provement sales contract if written notice is given to the seller at his 
place of business, or is mailed to him by certified letter, by 5:00 p.m. 
of the next business day following the execution of the contract.125 
Notice of the right to rescind must be printed in eight-point type 
on the home improvement contract.126 
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code127 and the laws 
of several states128 contain provisions calling for a cooling-off pe-
riod.120 Most of these statutes apply to all sales made through home 
solicitations;130 but the Michigan statute, which is not limited to 
rating while waiting for the assignee to sue. In Michigan, where consumer sales arc 
presently covered by three major acts, the adoption of a comprehensive deceptive-
practices statu_te would reduce the complexity of handling consumer cases. 
122. See text accompanying notes 87-89 supra. 
123. See Iu. . .ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, §§ 261-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970) (covers 
goods and services sold at the buyer's home); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255D, § 14 
(Supp. 1969) (covers installment sales of any goods and services if such sales are ex• 
ecuted somewhere other than the seller's place of business); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454 
(Supp. 1969) (covers goods and services sold anywhere). 
124. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445, 1101 (1967). 
125. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1202(c)(4) (1967). 
126. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.I202(b)(4) (1967). Statutes such as this one will 
be effective only if consumers know that they have a right of rescission and are able to 
exercise that right effectively. This is especially critical since in most cases the right 
must be exercised within a short time after the execution of the contract. The require-
ment that notice be displayed in eight-point type will increase utilization of the 
statute, but will not itself always adequately inform the low-income consumer. A 
better approach would be to require that the seller provide the buyer with a separate 
notice of the right to rescind and a separate form for exercising the right, such as a 
post card. See Project, The Direct Selling lndustry: An Empirical Study, 16 UCLA 
L. REv. 890, 1014 (1969). 
127. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.502(1)-(3), 2.503(2) (Proposed Draft, 
1969). 
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-134 to .139 (Supp. 1969); !LL • .ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, 
§§ 261-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWS .ANN. ch. 255D, § 14 (Supp. 
1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-203 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454 
(Supp. 1969). 
129. See note 123 supra. 
130. See, e.g., Iu.. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, §§ 261-71 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970); l\lAss. 
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255D, § 14 (Supp. 1969); WASH. LAWS. ch. 234 WASH. REv. CODE 
§ 63.14.154 (Supp. 1969). 
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home solicitations, covers only home improvement contracts.131 The 
Michigan Act therefore offers little benefit to the large percentage 
of inner-city residents who do not mm their own homes. 
There has been some controversy among commentators concern-
ing the value to the consumer of cooling-off provisions.132 One 
recent study, for example, concluded that a cooling-off provision in 
the Connecticut Home Solicitations Sales Act benefited the consumer 
very little.133 The study showed that most consumers did not re-
consider a contract until after the goods were received or the services 
performed, which was usually long after the cooling-off period had 
ended. Yet if the statutory cooling-off period did significantly extend 
the length of time within which the buyer could rescind-such as 
providing for a period extending to the time of the seller's first 
performance on the contract-then, at least according to the business-
men, retail sales and the financing process would be intolerably 
burdened.134 
Despite the doubts expressed both by advocates of consumer in-
terests and by businessmen concerning the efficacy of various types of 
cooling-off provisions, the idea of providing the buyer with a right of 
rescission under appropriate circumstances is probably a sound one.135 
131. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 445.1202{c), .1203{l) {1967). 
132. See Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 421-22, in which it is argued that 
there are many consumers who would like to rescind but cannot. No evidence is 
offered, however, to show that if a statute allowed consumers to rescind, the con• 
sumers would utilize the statute. 
133. Note, supra note 104, at 628-30. The only difference between the Michigan 
and Connecticut statutes is the requirement in Michigan that the contract contain a 
notice of the right to rescind. The Connecticut statute did not have such a require-
ment, but this absence probably did not cause the lack of effectiveness of the Connecti-
cut cooling-off provision. Lawyers for the poor indicate that cooling-off provisions do 
little to aid the poor, because poor people generally do not own homes, because the 
poor are seldom aware of the right to rescind even if that right does exist, and because, 
even when the poor are aware of such a provision, they are seldom able to utilize it. 
Donnelly Interview, supra note 98. 
134. Note, supra note 104, at 628-30. Opposition to cooling-off statutes is found 
primarily among reputable merchants. Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Em• 
pirical Study, 16 UCLA L. REv. 890, 1008-09 {1969). Such merchants feel that a 
statute eliminating cut-offs would harm them and would not affect the fly-by-night 
sellers who presumably present the most difficulties. Id. at 1009. 
135. There is danger that emphasis on the availability of a cooling-off provision 
will obscure other rights of the purchaser. For example, the agreement which a con-
sumer signs at his home is usually an offer by the buyer, not a binding contract. The 
buyer becomes bound only when acceptance is made at the seller's home office and 
until that time the buyer has the right to withdraw his offer. G. GRISMORE, CoNTRAcrs 
§ 32 {rev. ed. 1965). The consumer will probably feel, however, that he has only the 
cooling-off period in which to rescind when in fact he may be able to revoke his offer 
for a much longer period. Most consumers do not even realize they are signing only 
an offer and that they have a right to revoke until an acceptance is received. The 
solution to this problem seems to be increased education of consumers regarding 
their legal rights or perhaps a requirement that salesmen inform consumers of the 
significance of the document they are signing. In addition, the cooling-off period could 
be made longer in order to reflect more accurately the normal time which sellers take 
to accept offers. 
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For example, a statute allowing rescission, within a reasonable time, 
of all sales of goods and services under an installment credit con-
tract solicited at the consumer's home would be of value to the 
consumer and would not place an extreme burden on retail dealers136 
or financial institutions. A reasonable time period, coupled with clear 
notice on the face of the installment contract that the buyer had 
the right to rescind, 137 would afford the consumer the opportunity 
to re-evaluate his purchase out of the presence of the salesman and 
to check over the contract to ensure that it accurately reflects his con-
ception of the oral agreement he has consummated. The dealer could 
protect himself by postponing performance on the contract until 
the buyer has waived his right of rescission or until the period for 
rescission has run. Alternatively, the statute could protect dealers 
through the inclusion of a provision requiring the buyer to pay a 
small percentage of the purchase price for each day between the 
execution of the contract and rescission, 138 with the percentage in-
creasing in proportion to the time elapsed. Combined with an eff ec-
tive consumer education and credit counseling program, a statute 
granting the consumer a right of rescission would operate as a check 
on at least the most blatant dealer malpractices and would encourage 
more rational purchasing on the part of consumers. 
Before leaving the discussion of consumer protection legislation, 
it is worthwhile to consider a recent attempt in Michigan to combat 
deceptive advertising. In 1966 the Michigan legislature enacted a 
new false-advertising statute which provides for civil remedies against 
violators.139 The act, which reflects the current trend away from 
reliance upon criminal statutes to protect the consumer,140 prohibits 
anyone from "knowingly" placing ·before the public any untrue, 
deceptive, or misleading statement,141 and from publishing an ad-
vertisement either with the intent not to sell at the price stated 
therein or with the intent not to sell the goods or services that were 
advertised.142 Pursuant to the act's remedial provisions, the Attorney 
136. Indeed, many reputable businesses, especially large department stores, offer 
liberal rescission privileges even when there is no statute requiring them to do so. 
Thus, it can be argued that an extension of the right to rescission to all consumer 
sales would have a substantial effect on only those merchants dealing largely with low-
income consumers. 
137. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1202(c)(4) (1967). 
138. There is a clause of this sort in at least one state statute. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
73, § 500-206(£) (Supp. 1969). See also MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.1202 (1967). 
139. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.801-.809 (1967). 
140. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Trans-
action Problems, 48 B.U. L. REv. 559, 584-85 (1968). 
141. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.801 (1967), 
142. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.805 (1967). This section prohibits so-called "bait" 
advertising, which occurs when an advertisement for one article is used as an induce-
ment for the sale of higher-priced goods. 
April 1970] Comments 949 
General may ask for an injunction against the continuation of a 
violation,143 but such a request may be granted only after the de-
fendant has been given forty-eight hours to cease violating the 
statute.144 In the event an injunction is obtained, a subsequent viola-
tion of it subjects the merchant to a fine of not more than one 
thousand dollars.145 The Attorney General may also accept an assur-
ance of discontinuance from a person allegedly in violation of the 
act.146 This assurance, which does not constitute an admission of 
any fact or issue at law, must be filed with the clerk of an appropriate 
circuit court.147 The act says nothing about any sanction for violating 
the terms of an assurance. 148 
The new statute has several basic weaknesses, First, the require-
ment that the dealer be notified forty-eight hours in advance of any 
attempted injunction and that he be given the opportunity in all 
cases, to desist voluntarily, compels the Attorney General to deal 
with flagrant or frequent violators in the same way that he deals with 
first offenders. Although it seems fair to give first offenders the chance 
to desist voluntarily, the same is not true of frequent violators since 
they have shown that their voluntary compliance is not made in 
good faith.140 In addition, the fine is in reality meaningless; it is not 
severe enough to act as a deterrent and can easily be absorbed as 
a cost of doing business by all but the smallest dealers. Finally, 
injunctive relief by itself provides only prospective relief; it does 
nothing to rectify the economic in jury already suffered by those 
who have been defrauded by the deceptive advertising. It is difficult 
to assess the effectiveness of this act in practical terms, since it has 
been "invoked" only once in the three years of its existence.150 But 
for the reasons suggested, it does not appear to be a particufarly 
143. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.807(1) (1967). 
144. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN,§ 445.807(2) (1967). 
145. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 445.808 (1967). 
146. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.809 (1967). 
147. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 445.809 (1967). 
148. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.808 (1967) provides a penalty for violation only 
of an order or injunction issued pursuant to the act. Although the assurance must be 
filed with the court, no order is issued, and thus the assurance does not come within 
the scope of § 445.808. The question is open whether a violation of an assurance 
allows the Attorney General to ask for an injunction without again giving the merchant 
notice and an opportunity to cease the prohibited conduct. 
149. With regard to frequent violators, the Attorney General perhaps should be 
given authority to take direct action without giving the violator an opportunity to 
desist. Such a provision would allow a full range of contempt sanctions to be applied 
against the dealer who has demonstrated bad faith and would prohibit him from 
playing cat and mouse with the Attorney General by a cunning use of voluntary agree-
ments to desist. 
150. In that case, an assurance was obtained during the Christmas season from a 
Detroit jeweler who agreed not to continue advertising used watches as new. No other 
action was taken and no relief was given to defrauded customers, although a few 
settlements were obtained. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E, at I, col. I. 
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potent weapon against deceptive advertisers; and unless it is used 
more frequently, it can obviously have little impact in the consumer 
protection area. 
The sad truth about the entire Michigan statutory scheme is that 
this new false-advertising statute is the only real weapon with which 
the Attorney General can wage the war against consumer fraud. His 
authority to ask for injunctions under either the Retail Installment 
Sales Act or the Home Improvement Sales Finance Act is essentially 
meaningless, since violations of those statutes are seldom prosecuted 
and are rarely repeated.151 In summary, Michigan's Attorney General 
is given inadequate power and resources to deal with the limited 
problems of false advertising and illegal credit arrangements-and no 
power at all to deal with other types of fraudulent and deceptive 
practices in the market place. 
II. THE ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY 
The five principal agencies charged with enforcing the criminal 
and civil consumer protection statutes in Michigan are the local 
police and prosecutors, 152 the Secretary of State, the Financial Insti-
tutions Bureau of the Department of Commerce,153 the Attorney Gen-
eral,154 and the Bureau of Consumer Protection in the Department 
of Agriculture.155 
A. The Prosecuting Attorney and the Police Department 
Since the most pressing consumer fraud problems in the State of 
Michigan are related to the exploitation of low-income consumers 
in t:ne city of Detroit,156 it is worthwhile to consider what enforce-
ment agencies are available to consumers in the Detroit area. The 
151. There have been only two prosecutions under each act since they were enacted, 
and no injunctions have been issued. Nolan Interview, supra note 18; see text accom-
panying notes 189-90 infra. 
152. See text accompanying notes 157-200 infra. 
153. See text accompanying notes 201-64 infra. 
154. See text accompanying notes 265-78 infra. 
155. This Bureau has regulatory power with respect to the quality of goods and 
drugs, and it deals with deceptive practices only as they relate to this primary function. 
The Bureau of Consumer Protection is not concerned with installment sales. As a 
resnlt, the Bureau is not in the mainstream of consumer protection activity. Neverthe-
less, the Bureau does have a great deal of expertise in matters relating to public 
health, and it performs important services in that area. Thus the Bureau should retain 
jurisdiction over the narrow area of deceptive practices that are within the ambit of 
public-health matters. This does not mean that the administrator of state deceptive-
practice legislation cannot take cognizance of deceptive acts also regulated by the 
Department of ,Agriculture, for the nature of the product should not leave a merchant 
immune from the greater variety of sanctions and remedies available to the ad-
ministrator. 
156. See note 12 supra. 
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most obvious of those agencies are the Wayne County prosecutor 
and the Detroit police department. Hence, it is important to evaluate 
the effectiveness of those agencies in enforcing the criminal laws of 
the state in order to prevent or punish fraudulent conduct and in 
order to secure relief for defrauded consumers. 
The Wayne County prosecutor has established a Fraud and Spe-
cial Services Section (Fraud Section) to hear, and act directly upon, 
complaints from consumers. The Fraud Section is headed by an 
assistant prosecutor, and he is aided by two other assistant prosecutors 
who work only on consumer fraud problems, and by one investigator. 
Consumer fraud, however, is not the only area supervised by the 
Fraud Section;157 cases involving embezzlement, larceny by conver-
sion, improper use of credit cards, violations of the state employment 
and wage laws, and illegal receipt or withholding of welfare allo-w-
ances are handled as well.158 In fact, of 239 warrants processed by the 
fraud section from May to August 1969, only twelve were for offenses 
that could be classified as fraudulent business practices; and· most of 
those warrants involved fraudulent practices that were not related to 
consumer transactions.11i9 Nevertheless, the bulk of the actual, work-
ing time of the members of the fraud section is devoted to hearing 
and acting upon consumer complaints, since all other types of offenses 
are first investigated by the Fraud Division of the police department, 
and since the function of the prosecutor's Fraud Section in those 
cases is usually limited to the decision whether or not to issue a 
warrant.160 
The Fraud Division of the police department is located in the 
same building as the prosecutor's Fraud Section, and until recently 
all consumer complaints were handled initially by the police.161 Al-
though the prosecutor now hears some consumer complaints directly, 
the majority of the complaints received by the Fraud Section are still 
processed first by the police Fraud Division.162 Under the customary 
procedure, therefore, the Fraud Section does not see a complaint un-
less a warrant recommendation is submitted by the detective investi-
gating the case. This screening process would present no difficulties 
if the police and prosecutor had the same philosophy with regard to 
the enforcement of the legislation prohibiting fraud in the market 
157. ,vhen not prosecuting fraudulent merchants, the assistant prosecutor may 
well be processing charges resulting from bar room brawls or a vice raid on a brothel. 
158. FRAUD AND SPECIAL SERVICES SECTION, WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, RE-
PORT ON ,vARRANT RECOMMENDATIONS, May-August 1969. 
159. Id.; Nolan Interview, supra note 18. A clerk who submitted false vouchers for 
payment by his employer would be prosecuted under the same statute as a merchant 
making false representations to a consumer in order to induce a sale. 
160. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
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place, and if both had the same ability to judge the legal sufficiency 
of a complaint. But unlike the prosecutor's Fraud Section, which 
favors increased use of criminal sanctions against dishonest mer-
chants, 163 the police officials in the Fraud Division regard themselves 
as little more than a mediation service.164 Hence, although the police 
have been quite successful at persuading businessmen to make resti-
tution to complaining consumers,165 they have done little to help the 
vast majority of defrauded consumers who do not seek governmental 
assistance.166 Furthermore, very few of the cases in which the police 
Fraud Division has decided to seek warrants involve ordinary fraudu-
lent business practices; rather, most of the warrants have been issued 
against perpetrators of unusual fraudulent schemes unrelated to nor-
mal consumer transactions.167 Even the cases that have involved "nor-
mal" consumer fraud have not always been properly disposed of; 
many cases have been dropped by the Fraud Division on the ground 
that the acts complained of did not constitute a criminal violation, al-
though in fact a case could have been made out under one of the stat-
utes less commonly used in consumer fraud cases.168 In fairness to the 
police department, however, it must be noted that the Fraud Division 
has only one detective with legal training and that it suffers from a 
severe manpower shortage since only four detectives are assigned to 
the broad category of fraud work.169 Those four men are responsible 
for approximately 1,200 investigations per month in the general area 
of frauds,170 and those investigations give rise to between twenty-four 
and seventy-one warrants per month.171 Moreover, these figures do not 
include the "mediation services," which account for the settlement of 
a vast majority of the three hundred or more consumer fraud com-
plaints received annually.172 Finally, the Fraud Division's emphasis on 
mediation rather than on prosecution is not unpopular among ag-
163. Id. 
164. Id. Interview with Edward V. Boggs, Lieutenant, Fraud Division, Detroit Police 
Department, Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 2, 1969 [hereinafter Boggs Interview]. 
165. Id. 
166. The assistant prosecutor in charge of the Fraud and Special Services Section 
estimates that 98 to 99% of consumers who are defrauded do not seek his help. Nolan 
Interview, supra note 18; see text accompanying notes 276-93 infra. Obviously, media-
tion does not solve the essential problems of stopping the deceptive practices and 
deterring violators from future deceptive conduct. Mediation alone may even be harm-
ful, since it reduces the desire of the victim to seek other governmental action. 
167. Boggs Interview, supra note 164. 
168. For example, restitution was obtained from a retailer selling prepaid television 
repair contracts, when it was determined that this type of activity was arguably 
covered by insurance regulation laws. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
169. This category includes the enforcement, inter alia, of blue-sky laws, confidence 
schemes, and credit card and check forgery cases. Boggs Interview, supra note 164. 
170. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION MONTHLY WORK REPORT, July-Sept. 1959. 
171. Id. 
172. Boggs Interview, supra note 164. 
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grieved consumers. Complainants are not particularly interested in 
prosecution of unscrupulous merchants; rather they are interested in 
the quickest and most effective way of getting their money back-
and that way is most often through the mediation services.173 But re-
gardless of whether the police department has been somehow culpable 
for the lack of concerted action against fraudulent merchants-and 
there are sound reasons to believe that it has not-the fact remains 
that the Fraud Division has not been a potent force in the fight 
against consumer fraud. 
The increased activity of the prosecutor in the consumer fraud 
area is at least in part a response to the lack of effective police action. 
Although the police Fraud Division still initially handles the bulk 
of routine consumer fraud matters, the prosecutor's Fraud Section 
has attempted to open direct lines of communication between its 
office and defrauded consumers.174 This method of operation is ap-
parently neither unique nor particularly common among prosecutors 
in major urban areas.175 The motives underlying direct action by 
173. Any changes giving greater authority to law-enforcement officials are not, of 
course, designed to eliminate or even reduce mediation efforts. For many consumers 
mediation will always remain the most efficient way to obtain restitution, especially 
in small-claims cases. What is desired is a system which provides the consumer with 
his remedy, but at the same time docs not discourage the prosecution of, or other 
action against, fraudulent merchants. 
174. The assistant prosecutor has requested various individuals and groups con-
cerned with the problems of low-income consumers-particularly Neighborhood Legal 
Services, urban clinics, and local consumers' councils-to inform him of the fraudulent 
practices currently being used in the inner city. He also has met with consumer groups 
both to solicit complaints and to exchange ideas concerning the most effective strategy 
for combatting fraud. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
175. The Michigan Law Review sent inquiries to prosecutors or district attorneys 
in thirty-two major cities; fifteen prosecutorial offices sent replies outlining their con-
sumer protection activities. Five (Baltimore, St. Louis, Phoenix, Newark, and Denver) 
reported that they performed no consumer protection functions of any consequence 
unless a clear criminal violation of a substantial nature was involved, and that all 
cases-the great majority-were sent to the attorney general or to some other state 
official. In four of these states there is reasonably strong deceptive practice legislation. 
On the other hand, in cities located in states that have not enacted strong deceptive 
practices legislation, the pattern is similar to that found in Detroit: the prosecutor does 
what he can with only ill-suited criminal laws to use as leverage, and much mediation 
is performed with few actual prosecutions. Usually the police perform the investigative 
work, but one prosecutor (in Portland, Oregon) found the same problems with that 
system as did the prosecutor in Detroit; and he solved it in the same manner, soliciting 
his own complaints and dealing directly with the public. The remaining six prosecu-
torial offices (Bronx, Queens, Brooklyn, and Manhattan in New York, and San Francisco 
and Los Angeles in California) are aided by fraud bureaus in the attorney general's 
office, but there is no comprehensive state statute giving a full range of remedies. In 
all six of these areas, consumers make complaints directly to the district attorney's 
office; investigation is then conducted by the police assigned to that office. New York 
City also has established a strong department of consumer affairs; and it has a home-
rule consumer protection act, but the prosecutor plays no part in the enforcement of 
that act. In the cities, in which the prosecutor has authority to enforce an injunction 
statute, especially in San Francisco and Los Angeles, consumer protection activity is 
marked by a spirit of cooperation between the state and local agencies. The probable 
result is that there is more protection in those cities than there is in cities with no 
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the prosecutor are to provide more vigorous action against business-
men operating in a fraudulent manner, to aid the vast majority of 
defrauded consumers who do not complain to the police, and to dis-
cover as early as possible the appearance of dishonest merchants who 
are not yet listed in police records.176 During the past several months 
the Fraud Section has received between 200 and 300 complaints re-
ferred from Neighborhood Legal Services,177 private attorneys,178 the 
Urban Clinic of the University of Detroit Law School,179 and individ-
uals in the community who have learned about the prosecutor's 
activities.180 Leaders of indigenous consumer groups in the inner city 
have reported confidence in the Fraud Section,181 and that confidence 
may justify vesting concurrent jurisdiction in the Attorney General 
and the prosecutor when, and if, a broad deceptive-practices statute 
is enacted in Michigan.1s2 
The Fraud Section has obtained some favorable results in the 
fight against fraudulent merchants, but it has not done so without 
difficulty. The main problems confronting the Fraud Section are lack 
of manpower, attempts by defendants or potential defendants to 
undercut prosecutions by settling with the victim,183 and judicial 
insensitivity to the serious nature of fraudulent business practices. 
Prosecutions for various types of fraud often require considerable 
investigative work, mainly in the form of obtaining circumstantial 
state action, and perhaps more than there is in cities in which there is a strong state 
provision but listless enforcement. However, in those six areas, the coordination be-
tween the agencies involved is not as great as would exist if one official possessed 
plenary power in this area, and there are probably wasted resources. If nothing else, 
Detroit should assign Detroit city police to the prosecutor's office in order to aid the 
prosecutor in making investigations. See text accompanying note 185 infra. 
176. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
177. This source of complaints seems to be particularly promising. See FTC PRO• 
TECTION PROGRAM, supra note 39, at 4. 
178. In one case, an attorney for a finance company who defended several merchants 
filed a complaint that his daughter had been defrauded, and the prosecutor promptly 
obtained restitution. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
179. The Urban Clinic is a legal-aid society staffed by students from the University 
of Detroit Law School. 
180. Leaders of consumer groups have reported that the reputation of the prosecu-
tor's office is spreading in the inner city, and that consumers now take complaints 
directly to the Fraud Section, bypassing other agencies such as the police or the Better 
Business Bureau. Interview with Consumers' Research Advisory Council, Detroit, 
Michigan, Aug. 21, 1969. 
181. Interview, supra note 180. 
182. It should be noted that the trend in the model legislation is to vest sole 
authority in the attorney general. See text accompanying notes 291-92 infra. If con• 
current jurisdiction were granted to both the prosecutor and the attorney general, 
the attorney general would still have plenary power over all actions, but the local 
prosecutors could also act after notifying the attorney general and affording him the 
opportunity to intervene. See N.M. STAT, ANN. § 49-15-13 (Supp. 1969). 
183. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
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evidence to show fraudulent intent;184 but the prosecutor has only 
one investigator. Moreover, the prosecutor, as a county official, does 
not have authority over the Detroit police department and thus can-
not utilize its services for his investigative work.185 Even when the 
Fraud Section is able to obtain the necessary information to go to 
court, and the victim is willing to testify, there remains the problem 
that the judges in the Recorder's Court apparently do not believe 
that defrauding poor people is a serious offense.186 Perhaps this seem-
ing incredulity can be explained by the fact that the judge in a given 
case sees only one violation by the defendant unless that defendant 
has been convicted previously, and thus does not generally realize 
the history of fraudulent dealings in which the defendant may have 
engaged.187 In addition, neither judge nor jury is very willing to 
send a businessman to jail. But whatever the reason for the hesitancy 
on the part of courts to apply criminal sanctions to dishonest mer-
chants, it seems clear that the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution 
is not enhanced when a suspended sentence is given to a dealer with 
several hundred complaints against him. Apart from the problem of 
judicial sympathy to members of the business community, the prose-
cutor faces pressure from judges who feel that he is wasting the 
court's time and the taxpayers' money by prosecuting such petty 
crimes as consumer fraud when muggers and rapists roam the 
streets.188 Despite these difficulties, the prosecutor's fraud section has 
obtained several convictions, including two for violation of the Re-
tail Installment Sales Act189 and two for violation of the Motor Ve-
hicle Sales Finance Act.100 Those convictions arose out of the first 
prosecutions in the history of both statutes.191 
The Fraud Section has achieved its limited successes by using, or 
threatening to use, the extreme sanction of a criminal action. As a 
result of the increased vitality of the Fraud Section in the consumer 
fraud area, and as a result of the assistant prosecutor's willingness to 
184. Id. 
185. Detroit could increase the usefulness of the prosecutor's Fraud Section by 
assigning skilled police officers to that office, as is presently done in several major 
cities. See note 171 supra. Alternatively, the Section could be authorized more than one 
investigator of its own choice. 
186. This conclusion was derived from a series of interviews with individuals in• 
volved in consumer protection activities. The consensus was that Recorder's Court 
judges simply do not view "white collar" offenses as real crimes deserving the im-
position of sc,•ere penalties. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra 
note 18. 
187. This fact illustrates another advantage of using injunctions or other civil 
proceedings: evidence of a merchant's past business practices may be presented to the 
judge. Sre notes 317-23 infra and accompanying text. 
188. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
189. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.856 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
190. MICH, CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.137 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
191. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
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go to court, the Better Business Bureau and related groups, such as 
Neighborhood Legal Services, have been able to use the mere threat 
of invoking the assistance of the Fraud Section to obtain settlements 
on behalf of defrauded consumers and in some cases even to effectuate 
a change in business practices.192 Thus, for example, although there 
have been only four prosecutions for violations of legislation pro-
hibiting a dealer from using blank contracts in the sale of automo-
biles193 or other consumer goods, 194 reports from consumer groups 
and legal services indicate that the use of blank contracts has sig-
nificantly decreased since the assistant prosecutor's consumer pro-
tection campaign began.195 However, outside the area in which 
legislation precisely defines the prohibited conduct, thus enabling 
potential offenders easily to compare their business practices with 
conduct that is being prosecuted, the deterrent effect of criminal 
prosecutions is substantially reduced. The prosecutor admits, for 
instance, that he is able successfully to attack false and deceptive 
advertising only upon a case-by-case basis.196 A deceptive advertiser 
may reform his practices when he is directly confronted with a threat 
of prosecution, but the fact that another dealer is being prosecuted 
for an advertisement that bears little resemblance to his own seldom 
deters him from engaging in such practices. Perhaps this situation is 
as it should be. Giving a law-enforcement official the unfettered abil-
ity to use threats of prosecution in order to control the dissemination of 
business information would certainly raise grave constitutional ques-
tions about the chilling effect of that power upon free speech.191 
Moreover, such power could tend to stifle experimentation and 
originality in the marketing of consumer goods. 
In essence, the argument against making the prosecutor and the 
criminal law the primary weapons in the fight against the perpetrators 
of consumer fraud is not that criminal sanctions are inappropriate 
for the offenses commonly committed; indeed, in certain cases harsh 
treatment may not only be warranted,198 but may be uniquely effec-
192. Donnelly Interview, supra note 98; Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
193. MicH. Cm,1p. LAws ANN. § 492.112 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
194. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.856 (1967); Nolan Interview, supra note 18, 
195. One automobile dealer now keeps all of his blank installment sales contracts 
in a safe to ensure that none is ever used without his supervision. Donnelly Interview, 
supra note 98. 
196. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
197. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Note, The Chilling Effect in Con-
stitutional Law, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969). 
198. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 
1966). The pyramid franchising operations of the defendant in this case were so blatant 
and involved so many innocent consumers in unconscionable transactions that the 
judge recommended to the prosecutor that criminal prosecution be initiated for a wide 
variety of offenses. The culpability of the perpetrators was felt to be so great that even 
a permanent injunction and business dissolution was not considered a severe enough 
sanction or deterrent. 
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tive as well. In the great majority of cases, however, criminal convic-
tions are difficult to obtain and are likely to result in relatively light 
sentences.199 Furthermore, law-enforcement activity generally results 
in restriction for only the small number of victimized consumers 
who are involved in mediation,200 and it may result in only a tem-
porary and sporadic halt in deceptive practices. .AJ; mentioned pre-
viously, one possible solution to this problem is to make the prosecu-
tor a co-enforcer, with the Attorney General, of a comprehensive 
deceptive-practices statute. But until such a statute is enacted, the 
prosecutor will be forced to continue his bludgeon tactics without 
much hope of making a substantial dent in the volume of fraudulent 
business practices plaguing the inner city. The problem in Detroit 
is not lack of concern or initiative on the part of the prosecutor; 
rather, the problem is that the tools of enforcement with which he 
is provided to combat consumer fraud are simply unsuited to the 
task. 
B. Licensing Statutes 
All automobile dealers in Michigan must be licensed under the 
Motor Vehicle Code,201 and the Secretary of State is empowered by 
the Code to issue such licenses.202 In addition, automobile dealers 
who sell on an installment basis-and the financial institutions tak-
ing assignments of such contracts-must also be licensed under the 
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act;203 and the Act vests authority to 
grant such licenses in the Financial Institutions Bureau204 whose pri-
mary responsibility is to ensure the financial integrity of lending 
institutions, including automobile dealers who finance their own 
installment sales.206 The latter Act is the only licensing provision in 
Michigan applicable to retail dealers offering installment sales to the 
public. 
Both statutes impose a general requirement of character and fit-
ness upon the applicants for those licenses.200 If an applicant is re-
jected either by the Secretary or by the Bureau, he may appeal the 
decision to the state's circuit court.207 Both agencies may also revoke 
a license if the dealer holding it is found to have engaged in fraudu-
199. Boggs Interview, supra note 164; Nolan Interview, supra note 18; see Effective 
Programs, supra note 16, at 426-27. 
200. See note 166 supra and accompanying text. 
201. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.248-.250 (1967). 
202. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(a) (1967). 
203. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.103 {1967). 
204. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 492.103(1) (1967). 
205. Tricrweiler Interview, supra note 67. 
206. MICH. COIIIP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.248(b), 492.108(a) (1967). 
207. MICH. COIIIP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.250(b), 492.I0B(b} (1967). 
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lent activities. 208 Again, appeals from a decision revoking a license 
may be taken to the circuit court.200 Of course, withdrawal of a li-
cense by the Financial Institutions Bureau pursuant to the provisions 
of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act prohibits only the installment 
sales of vehicles; and consequently cash sales may continue until the 
Secretary of State acts, after a formal hearing, to remove the seller's 
general dealer's license. Indeed, the Financial Institutions Bureau is 
concerned with automobile dealers only insofar as they act as lending . 
institutions, and it regulates them only with regard to their financial 
affairs. 210 
Ideally, the licensing provisions of both acts must be used either 
to prevent probable defrauders from obtaining a license or to re-
move a license from a dealer who is operating in a fraudulent man-
ner.211 In practice, however, the licensing acts have not been used 
for those purposes;212 and as a result, the consumer benefits little 
from their existence. 
There are several reasons for the ineffectiveness of the licensing 
statutes. First, the state does not have enough information about ap-
plicants to prevent dishonest merchants from receiving a license. 
Both the Motor Vehicle Code and the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance 
Act require an applicant for a license to submit a detailed form. If 
the dealer is a corporation, the form must include the names and 
addresses of all directors and the name and address of some individual 
who has power of attorney to receive process.213 The Motor Vehicle 
Code also requires a statement of the previous history of the appli-
cant "sufficient to establish . . . [his] reputation and character in 
business,"214 and a statement disclosing any previous license applica-
208. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 257.249(d), 492.I09(a)(9) (1967). 
209. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 257.250(b), 492.109(d) (1967). 
210. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.110 (1967) permits the Financial Institutions 
Bureau to examine the books and records of a licensee and to subpoena witnesses or 
documents. Essentially the field investigators seek to determine whether the dealer is 
using sound methods of record-keeping and accounting, whether he charges proper 
credit rates, and whether he has exceeded the legal limit placed on loans made by 
certain financial institutions, such as small loan companies. Trienveiler Interview 
supra note 67; see text accompanying notes 232-34 infra. 
211. Of course, when a license is denied or removed, the dealer may be prosecuted 
for operating without a license. In Michigan, these provisions are of primary impor-
tance in the sales of used automobiles. First, the fly-by-night operator is precluded 
from selling new automobiles because of the requirement that new car dealers possess 
a valid dealer franchise from a manufacturer. The new car buyer, especially in Detroit, 
usually has a greater than average knowledge about automobiles than does the pur-
chaser of a used car. The new-car dealer must therefore respond to this more knowl-
edgeable group and cannot successfully use many sales gimmicks that he could use on 
less sophisticated buyers. Of course, a new-car dealer may also possess a license to sell 
used cars. 
212. See notes 213-16, 218 infra and accompanying text. 
213. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 257.248(b), 492.I04(b) (1967). 
214. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(b) (1967). 
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tions, suspensions, or revocations in Michigan.215 But apart from the 
character statement, no information is required concerning the ap-
plicant's business activities in other states. In general, therefore, the 
license application process does not provide the issuing authority 
with much information concerning the applicant's past business 
dealings, especially those of a noncriminal nature or those committed 
out of state.216 
A possible solution to this problem is to require each applicant 
to attest to his business ethics by submitting affidavits from the licens-
ing authority or attorney general of each state in which he has con-
ducted business activities. This requirement could eventually be sup-
plemented by the establishment of a national data bank to maintain 
records on actions taken against fraudulent dealers in all states; that 
data bank could then be used by licensing authorities in screening 
applicants.217 
The second reason for the ineffectiveness of licensing acts is that 
the authorities do not use even the available information and re-
sources to screen out undesirable applicants. Approval of a license 
application is, for the most part, a purely clerical function. The 
Motor Vehicle Code, for example, requires the Secretary of State to 
make an investigation of the applicant's qualifications within fifteen 
days after the receipt of the application.218 In practice that investiga-
tion consists simply of a check of back files of the Department of 
215. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.248(b) (1967). 
216. Effective Programs, supra note 16, at 420-21. 
217. This data bank would be similar in nature to the central file now used to 
ensure that a driver who has had his operator's license revoked does not obtain a 
license from another state. A state official would request information concerning the 
history of an applicant and would then make a determination as to whether this 
previous activity should bar the issuance of a license. The applicant would have an 
opportunity to reply to the information placed in the file by various officials, both 
before and during the licensing process. The file would be confidential, open only to 
state licensing officials and the applicant. 
Another possible improvement in the license application process would be to re-
quire the applicant to post a bond which would be forfeited if the dealer is found, 
in an administrative or judicial proceeding, to have engaged in fraudulent business 
practices. The bond would be used as a fund to reimburse defrauded victims who 
complain to licensing authorities. This procedure would help to stimulate consumers 
to file complaints. Applicants in Michigan are currently required to post a $10,000 
civil indemnity bond. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.288(g) (1967). This bond is to 
ensure that purchasers are reimbursed for any monetary loss caused by the fraudulent 
practices of a dealer or his employees. Unfortunately, the surety is not required to 
make reimbursement until judgment has been entered against the dealer in a court 
of record. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(9) (1967). In reality this procedure makes 
the bond worthless to an individual consumer, because the possible award is not high 
enough to justify litigation. Since there is adequate judicial review of a decision made 
by the Secretary of State [MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.250(b) (1967)], there is no 
compelling reason not to allow the Secretary of State to require dealers to make resti-
tution to consumers as a condition of remaining in business. Such a requirement would 
make the licensing structure a much more effective consumer aid. 
218, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN, § 257.248(e) (1967). 
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State to see if any action has ever been taken against the applicant, 
a credit check, and a check of the files of the state police and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to see if the applicant has ever been 
convicted of a felony.219 Under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, 
the Bureau of Financial Institutions is not required to go even that 
far. Although the Bureau has extensive investigative powers under 
the Act,220 there is no statutory requirement £or an investigation, and 
no application is ever challenged on the basis of information that 
does not appear on the application form itself. In practice if all the 
blanks on the application form are filled in correctly, and if the 
license fee is paid, an employee of the Bureau issues the license.221 
License renewals are also a matter of form. The Motor Vehicle 
Code specifically states that an investigation of a dealer seeking a 
renewed license is not required.222 It is unfortunate that so little 
concern is exhibited for license renewals since even the most vigorous 
preliminary investigations cannot eliminate all fraudulent dealers. 
Moreover, the business character of a dealer is easier to ascertain after 
a period of actual operation than it is before he has commenced func-
tioning. If more stringent renewal provisions were enacted, a more 
flexible approach to new applicants would be possible, since the 
Secretary of State could then issue what would amount to probation-
ary licenses to dealers with questionable backgrounds, and renewal 
privileges could be conditioned upon the licensee's avoidance of 
false and deceptive practices. 
A necessary incident to an effective licensing scheme is participa-
tion by the public or by public agencies in the licensing process. A 
consumer with a valid complaint against a dealer who is applying for 
license renewal-or against a dealer who has changed his name or 
location and is seeking a new license-should have the opportunity 
to be heard in opposition to the dealer's application. At the present 
time, the State of Michigan does not provide a specific procedure to 
afford consumers such an opportunity.223 But a notice provision could 
219. Interview with Joseph H. Mullaney, Legal Advisor to the Special License Di• 
vision, Secretary of State's Office, Lansing, Michigan, Aug. 22, 1969 [hereinafter Mul• 
laney Interview]. 
220. The Bureau may examine witnesses, issue subpoenas, and issue rules and regu-
lations relating to the Act. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§ 492.110 (1967). 
221. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67. 
222. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.248(e); see note 22!1 infra. 
223. Under the Motor Vehicle Code, a complaint by a consumer, if it is in writing 
and verified, could possibly lead to the denial of an application for the renewal of a 
dealer's license. If the Secretary of State, after investigation, finds the complaint to be 
meritorious, a full hearing may be conducted on that complaint. If the Secretary of 
State finds at the hearing that the charges are true, he can then apply one of three 
sanctions: suspension of the dealer's license, revocation of the license, or denial of an 
application for renewal of the license. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.249-.250 (1967). 
Of course, if a license is not due for renewal, denial of a renewal application is not 
an available sanction. Since a license may expire at any of several dates during the 
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be enacted requiring the Secretary of State to notify county prosecu-
tors, the Attorney General, and the general public whenever license 
applications are submitted.224 The current hearing procedure could 
then be used to adjudicate challenges against a dealer. It would be 
sufficient to allow challenges only against those applicants who seek 
a general dealer license under the Motor Vehicle Code; if that gen-
eral license is granted, the additional license for installment sales 
could then be granted as a matter of course.225 In cases in which the 
applicant's misconduct is not serious enough to warrant a rejection 
of his application, another means of protecting consumers with right-
ful claims and of stimulating them to file complaints could be pro-
vided. The Secretary could be empowered in such cases to require 
the applicant, as a condition of the issuance or renewal of his license, 
to make restitution to the consumer who is challenging the appli-
cation.226 
Both the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act227 and the Motor Ve-
hicle Code228 empower licensing officials to withdraw a dealer's li-
cense for disciplinary reasons. Under the former statute, the Financial 
Institutions Bureau may revoke or suspend a license-after thirty 
days notice is given to the offending dealer229-for any of ten reasons, 
year [MICH. CO?,IP. L\ws ANN. § 257.248(d) (1967)], the chance that an individual con-
sumer will intentionally become involved in the renewal process is slim. 
224. In order to implement such a procedure, an applicant could be required to 
submit notice of intent to seek a renewal thirty to sixty days before the expiration of 
his old license. Notice could then be given to law-enforcement officials through a 
newsletter and to the general public through an advertisement similar to those used 
in liquor license renewals. Attorneys and groups dealing with consumers would pre-
sumably be alert to such publication; but to ensure notice, they could ask to be 
placed on the mailing list for the newsletter. The extra cost could be offset by an in-
crease in license fees. The costs of such an administrative procedure would probably 
be minimal since most applications would probably not be challenged. To protect 
the dealer, his license could be extended pending the outcome of the hearing. 
225. The Bureau would still have the power to deny a renewal application on the 
basis of a technical statutory violation under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act. 
MICH. COMP. L\ws ANN. § 250.249 (1967). But the Bureau would no longer be em-
powered to reject a renewal request on the basis of complaints from buyers alleging 
fraudulent sales practices. 
226, Since the rather severe sanction of denial of a license is involved, it is necessary 
that as much evidence as possible of dealer misconduct be presented at the hearing 
and on review. Thus a primary advantage of this form of regulation is that it provides 
the opportunity to present claims in an effective manner, particularly if consumer 
groups become involved. To the extent that legal-services attorneys, urban clinics, and 
indigenous consumer groups act on the renewal notices, they will help to provide the 
needed link between the consumer and the government and thus will help to solve the 
present problem of inaccessibility. In addition, there is less chance that a dealer will 
escape sanction, as frequently happens in single-case adjudication, because of a failure 
of a victim or witness to testify. See text accompanying note 254 infra. 
227. MICH. CoMP. L\ws ANN. § 492.109(a) (1967). 
228. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.249 (1967). For a discussion of the Secretary of 
State's power to suspend or revoke a dealer's license under the Motor Vehicle Code, 
see text accompanying note 241 infra. 
229. MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.109(a) (1967). 
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including fraud in the sale of vehicles and willful failure to perform 
any written agreement.230 This power, however, is seldom if ever 
used; indeed, in the past four years there have been no suspensions 
or revocations under the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act.231 One 
reason for the lack of regulatory activity on the part of the Bureau 
is that its administrator believes that the prime function of the 
Bureau is not to regulate, but to use its extensive authority for the 
purpose of examining dealer records to ensure that statutory require-
ments are met, licensing fees are paid, and financial integrity is main-
tained.232 Thus the administrator evinces a conscious policy of defer-
ring to the Secretary of State in regard to matters of suspension or 
revocation. The only regulatory role which the Bureau does play is 
that of providing evidence and testifying at hearings and thereby 
assisting the Secretary of State in processing complaints against 
dealers. 
The fact that the Financial Institutions Bureau does not pursue 
an active role in dealer regulation, however, may not be of significant 
consequence to the consumer, since the Bureau is not, as an institu-
tion, an appropriate agency to deal with the problems of consumer 
fraud. The Bureau's primary administrative responsibility is to en-
force the licensing requirements for lending institutions-require-
ments that are contained in the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act233 
and the Small Loan Company Act.234 The Bureau's expertise, there-
fore, is in the area of finance, not in the area of retail-sales operations. 
In addition, two other factors prevent the Financial Institutions 
Bureau from being of assistance to consumers. Very few buyers of 
motor vehicles realize that the Bureau has been delegated authority 
to oversee sellers,235 and the Bureau has made no attempt to en-
courage complaints from consumers and thereby to publicize its 
role as overseer.236 The assistant prosecutor has occasionally referred 
complaints to the Bureau, but no revocations or suspensions have 
emanated from those referrals.237 Moreover, as in the case of the other 
agencies that are responsible for consumer protection, the Bureau is 
plagued by a serious personnel shortage; there are only three investi-
gators to police the 2,400 dealers and 230 financial institutions operat-
ing in Michigan.238 
230. MICH. CO.IIP. LAws ANN. § 492.I09(a)(9) (1967). 
231. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67. 
232. Id. See note 210 supra and accompanying text. 
233. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 492.101 (1967). 
234. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 493.1-.26 (1967). 
235. Donnelly Interview, supra note 98; Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
236. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67. 
237. Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
238. Trierweiler Interview, supra note 67. 
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It seems obvious, therefore, that the Financial Institutions Bureau 
is not an effective agency for protecting the consumer from deceptive 
sales practices by automobile dealers.239 Indeed, one of the problems 
with consumer protection legislation in Michigan is that the relevant 
statutes vest regulatory and enforcement authority in diverse agencies 
that are usually inadequately funded and that are often ill-suited for 
the task of combatting fraudulent business practices. It would seem 
much more logical, for example, to limit the jurisdiction of the 
Bureau to the function it performs best-ensuring the financial in-
tegrity of licensed lending institutions-and to turn over its nom-
inal authority in the consumer fraud area to the Secretary of 
State or to the Attorney General. If nothing else, this change 
would help to centralize enforcement authority and would focus re-
sponsibility for the safeguarding of consumer interests upon elected 
state officials.240 
The Secretary of State, however, must follow a more complicated 
procedure to revoke or suspend a license than must the Financial 
Institutions Bureau. Under the Motor Vehicle Code,241 the Secretary 
must investigate the circumstances of any complaint in order to de-
cide whether further proceedings are warranted. If the complaint is 
substantiated, the Secretary must give the licensee ten-days notice 
before a formal hearing is held on the merits. If, at the hearing, the 
hearing examiner finds against the licensee, he may enter an order 
suspending or revoking the license, and that order becomes final in 
thirty days unless in the meantime the licensee appeals to a circuit 
court. 
This administrative process is usually initiated by a complaint 
from one of the one hundred field investigators of the Department of 
State.242 But since the field investigators are empowered to enforce 
the entire Motor Vehicle Code, not just the licensing provisions,243 
they cannot, as a practical matter, spend much of their time investi-
gating fraudulent sales practices.244 Thus, while fraudulent practices 
are a basis for suspension under the Motor Vehicle Code,245 com-
239. See note 210 supra. 
240. The current enforcement machinery, in addition to inhibiting consumer ac-
cess, tends to disperse consumer pressure for reform. Consumers could use their po-
litical powers to better advantage if one agency were made responsible for the bulk of 
consumer protection programs. 
241. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.250 (1967). 
242. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
243. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.248-.250 (1967). 
244. Most of the work of the investigators does not involve consumer fraud. Com-
plaints usually relate to (I) violations of the reporting requirements that are es-
tablished to assist in the prosecution of automobile thefts, (2) cases involving the 
withholding or fraudulent concealment of payments owed to the state, or (3) cases 
involving dealers operating without a proper license. Mullaney Interview, supra note 
219. 
245. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.249(d) (1967). 
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plaints are rarely received alleging such practices, and licenses are 
seldom suspended for reasons of dealer fraud.246 Indeed, one of the 
first cases decided under the Motor Vehicle Code stated that the 
purpose of the licensing provisions was to ensure compliance with 
statutory requirements relating to reports and payment of reve-
nues, 247 rather than to protect the consumer. 
Complaints are also received at times from a county prosecutor 
or a private group such as the Better Business Bureau, but rarely 
are they received from a private citizen.248 As with the Financial 
Institutions Bureau, few consumers, especially those living in the 
inner city, realize that they can tum to the Secretary of State for 
protection against dishonest automobile dealers.249 There is little 
publicity concerning this function of the Secretary, and branch offices 
either refuse to process consumer complaints or do so with little 
enthusiasm.250 
Despite all the difficulties, however, a number of consumer fraud 
complaints are received each year, and some of them are deemed 
serious enough to require a full hearing.251 In those cases the one 
attorney in the license division usually acts as hearing officer, with 
a deputy attorney general designated as prosecutor.252 Both the Secre-
tary of State and the Attorney General are unhappy about this pro-
cedure, because it requires that a deputy attorney general be called 
from an undermanned staff in order to prosecute a matter with 
which he has little familiarity and which is usually based on a tech-
nical violation.253 As a consequence, prosecutions are probably not 
as vigorous as they might be in the hands of a knowledgeable prose-
246. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
247. Powers v. Vignam, 312 Mich. 315, 20 N.W.2d 203 (1945). This case was decided 
under a predecessor of the present act, MICH. COMP. LAws § 256.114(c) (1948). 
248. The fact that complaints are seldom received from private citizens is probably 
due to the lack of publicity about the Department and to the fact that very little 
mediation is done. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
249. Donnelly Interview, supra note 98; Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
250. The head of the Wayne County prosecutor's Fraud Section, who was deputized 
to prosecute one of the few actual consumer fraud cases heard recently, remarked that 
the assistant attorney general usually assigned to consumer fraud cases was inclined to 
adjourn the proceedings frequently or even to settle the case and dismiss the hearing. 
Nolan Interview, supra note 18. 
251. There are five levels of administrative action that can be utilized to process an 
alleged violation of the Motor Vehicle Code by a dealer. They range in complexity 
from the field level district proceeding-in which an investigator merely obtains an 
assurance from the dealer that the prohibited conduct will not continue--to a formal 
hearing. In fiscal 1968-1969, 317 dealers were cited for violating the Motor Vehicle 
Code. Of these dealers, only 49 were required to appear for a formal hearing. The 
remaining dealers had their cases settled either by a less formal proceeding or without 
any administrative hearing. Telephone Interview with Peter Bommarito, Director of 
Public Relations, Office of the Secretary of State, Lansing, Michigan, March 3, 1970. 
252. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
253. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219; Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
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cuting attorney. There is also the problem of obtaining witnesses. 
Most hearings are held in Lansing with the result that witnesses, 
especially those from Detroit, often fail to appear.254 The Department 
has taken steps to rectify this problem and has recently shown a 
willingness to move hearings to Detroit if inner-city residents are 
involved.21>5 
If the hearing examiner finds against the dealer on the complaint, 
he may enter an order suspending the dealer's license for a specified 
period of time. In almost every case, the dealer exercises his right of 
appeal to the circuit court.256 Of course, the actual suspension is de-
layed and the accused dealer is permitted to continue in business as 
usual pending the disposition of the appeal.257 Although the circuit 
court is not supposed to conduct a de novo review, it may, at its 
discretion, receive evidence that was not available at the time of the 
hearing.258 The court's function is not to weigh the evidence, but to 
ascertain whether it supports the findings of the hearing examiner.259 
In practice, the same problems exist in these appellate proceedings 
as in appellate proceedings under criminal statutes; judges usually do 
not have a complete record of the licensee's wrongdoing and thus 
generally treat him as a first offender.260 Accordingly, they either make 
an independent judgment of guilt or greatly reduce the penalty 
imposed by the hearing officer.261 
Even in the rare cases in which the license of a fraudulent dealer 
is ultimately suspended or revoked,262 however, the defrauded con-
sumer gains no benefit apart from the satisfaction of having the deal-
er's license removed. Moreover, the dishonest dealer may suffer no 
real penalty, for nothing in the statute prohibits the issuance of a 
new license to a relative or a business associate of the dealer, and 
the dealer's business may thus proceed as usual after a brief "remodel-
ing." 
In light of the delays and other difficulties associated with the 
254. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 257.250(b) (1967). 
258. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.250(b) (1967). 
259. See Salway v. Alger, 321 Mich. 211, 32 N.W.2d 505 (1948). It should be noted 
that in this case the dealer continued to function during the review. 
260. See text accompanying notes 186-88 supra. 
261. Mullaney Interview, supra note 219. 
262. During fiscal year 1968-1969, forty-nine cases were scheduled for a formal 
hearing. In two cases the dealer's license was revoked, while in two others a suspension 
was ordered. Three dealers went out of business pending the hearing. Five were given 
a conditional suspension on the condition that if any additional violations were de• 
tected during a stated period, the Secretary of State could seize the license without 
additional proceedings. The remaining cases are still pending. Bommarito Interview, 
supra note 251. 
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present license removal process that is administered by the Secretary 
of State, it seems advantageous to develop some alternative means 
of dealing with fraudulent automobile dealers. Perhaps the best 
method is to include in a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute 
a provision granting the Attorney General broad powers to combat 
all fraudulent business practices. Under such a provision, all juris-
diction over consumer fraud would be centralized in the Attorney 
General's office, and automobile dealers would be treated in the 
same manner as other retail merchants.263 The Secretary of State 
would retain the power to hold hearings and to remove dealer licenses 
for reasons other than fraudulent business practices, but all fraud 
complaints would go directly to the Attorney General. If the Attor-
ney General finds that a particular automobile dealer has engaged in 
illegal practices, he could directly order the dealer's license to be 
suspended or revoked, or he could take other administrative action 
against the dealer and submit the results of the hearing to the Secre-
tary of State for a determination of whether the dealer's license 
should be removed. In the event that the latter procedure is followed, 
the Secretary could make his decision without the added cost or delay 
of another administrative hearing. 
The primary advantage of such a system is that it would allow a 
full range of sanctions to be applied against a dishonest automobile 
dealer and would thus provide relief for the individual complainant 
as well as for the general public. If such a system were combined with 
increased public involvement in the licensing and renewal process,:io~ 
the consumer would be afforded significantly more protection against 
dishonest automobile dealers than he now receives from the lethargic 
practices of the Secretary of State. 
C. Attorney General 
In approximately half of the states, including Michigan, a con-
sumer fraud branch of the attorney general's office has been created 
either by statute or administrative action.265 But only in those states 
with strong deceptive-practice legislation, and centralized adminis-
tration of that legislation is sufficient authority delegated to that 
branch to allow the agency to be effective.266 In Michigan, therefore, 
263. For a further discussion of the possibility of making the attorney general the 
administrator of a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute, see pt. II. C. infra. 
264. See text accompanying notes 223-26 supra. 
265. See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective 
Programs for Action, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 429 (1966). Since that comment was pub-
lished, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Missouri have established consumer fraud bureaus. 
See ch. 143, §§ 1-16, [1969] COLO. LAws 371-76; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 93A, §§ 1-12 
(Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.010-130 (Supp. 1969). 
266. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93a, §§ 1-9 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-15-13 
(Supp. 1969). These are probably the two strongest consumer-fraud statutes in the 
nation. 
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the Consumer Fraud Bureau, like the similar agencies that exist in 
the numerous other states with a piecemeal approach to consumer 
protection,267 has few powers beyond the prestige of the Attorney 
General's office. 
The Consumer Fraud Bureau in Michigan was instituted by the 
Attorney General in 1959 without any action by the legislature; in 
fact, the first monetary expenditure for the Bureau was not autho-
rized until several years later.268 The current budgetary allocation 
for the Bureau is only 60,000 dollars per year, which permits the 
hiring of one deputy attorney general, one investigator, and three 
secretaries.269 The Bureau makes no attempt to solicit complaints-
for obvious economic and practical reasons-but approximately 1,500 
complaints are received annually at the Lansing office, either by 
phone or by mail.270 About sixty per cent of those complaints are 
mediated successfully; the rest are abandoned unresolved or are 
referred to some other agency.271 
The Bureau views its role as primarily that of encouraging settle-
ments, usually through a letter or a phone call to the offending mer-
chant.272 To a large extent, this limited view is a function of the lack 
of enforcement machinery at the Bureau's disposal. Apart from its 
general powers of persuasion and the ability to use the threat of 
adverse publicity, the Bureau 4as only three tools of enforcement 
that may be invoked against a dishonest merchant: the injunctive 
provisions of the Retail Installment Sales Act,273 those of the Home 
Improvement Finance Act,274 and those of the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act.275 As noted previously, these provisions are generally in-
effective to combat most fraudulent practices.276 The Bureau does 
maintain a "hot line" with prosecutors, better business bureaus, and 
other interested groups, in order to exchange information and to 
267. Comment, supra note 265, at 430-33. For an attorney general's view, see Saxbe, 
The Role of Government in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes 
Section of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 897 (1968). 
268, Platsis Interview, supra note 44; Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § E, at 1, col. 4. 
269. Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
270. Id. 
271. Id. For example, automobile cases are referred to the Secretary of State for 
possible licensing actions, and complaints against food dealers are referred to the 
Insurance Bureau of the Department of Commerce. In addition, if criminal sanctions 
seem warranted, notice is given to the appropriate county prosecutor. 
272. Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
273, MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.869 (1967). 
274. MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1422 (1967). 
275. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.807 (1967); see text accompanying notes 140-50 
supra. 
276. See text accompanying notes 59-65 supra. The injunctive provisions of the 
Retail Installment Sales Act and Home Improvement Finance Act have never been 
utilized either by the Attorney General or by a local prosecutor. Platsis Interview, 
supra note 44, 
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plot strategy for dealing with fraud schemes that are statewide.277 
But the "hot line" does not significantly benefit consumers because 
of the inability of the Bureau to apply adequate remedial provisions. 
Moreover, focusing upon statewide fraud schemes ignores the retail 
dealers' localized dishonest practices, which daily plague the urban 
poor. 
Although the Consumer Fraud Bureau is severely handicapped 
by an almost complete lack of effective enforcement powers, the At-
torney General frequently recommends new legislation and is cur-
rently urging the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission's Uni-
form Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act.278 But until there 
is legislation providing the Attorney General with comprehensive 
jurisdiction and enforcement powers with respect to fraud in the 
market place, little can be expected from the Consumer Fraud Bu-
reau in the way of effective action against dishonest merchants. 
Ill. SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
It seems apparent that the present statutory and administrative 
measures in Michigan for the relief of defrauded consumers are 
totally inadequate. The lack of integration in Michigan's statutory 
scheme, combined with the relative impotence of the substantive 
provisions dealing with consumer fraud, ensure that little can be 
done under current law to aid the victims of fraudulent business 
practices. The deficiencies in Michigan's statutory scheme are com-
pounded by the lack of effective action in this area from judicial and 
nongovernmental sources. The courts, instead of implementing 
needed reform in judicial administration, provide a system of justice 
that is unintelligible to the vast majority of citizens and seems op-
pressive to those most in need of assistance. Default judgments,219 
277. Detroit News, Oct. 5, 1969, § :E, at 1, col. l; Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
278. Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
279. The vast majority of suits by finance companies or merchants against con-
sumers are disposed of through default judgments. Indeed, the sales practices of many 
inner-city merchants are designed to rely upon eventual default by the consumer, 
followed quickly by a default judgment, repossession and resale of the goods, and 
garnishment. FTC CREDIT R.EPOl!.T, supra note 5, at 34. The common pleas court in 
Detroit, with nine full-time judges, handled 57,142 "assumpsit" and 6,445 "replevin" 
cases in 1968. 1968 ANNUAL !UP0RT OF COMMON PLEAS COURT 2. No figures are avail-
able as to the percentage of these cases disposed of through default judgments, but 
73,023 of the 76,258 cases adjudicated were not contested. Furthermore, $20,489,194 of 
the $22,882,243 awarded in judgments resulted from proceedings in which no defen-
dant appeared. Id. at 4. Staff members of the .Michigan Law Review examined, at 
random, several hundred assumpsit and replevin case records and were unable to find 
any in which a consumer had interposed an answer to the complaint. 
Aside from the social problems caused by such summary justice, this system wastes 
the money of taxpayers by providing merchants with an inexpensive collection agency; 
the court fees charged to merchants obtaining default judgments do not begin to cover 
the costs of operating the common pleas court. Interview with Herbert Levin, Clerk, 
Common Pleas Court, Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 16, 1969 [hereinafter Levin Interview]. 
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garnishment,280 lack of effective representation,281 and an archaic 
body of common law282 are conspicuous realities in lower courts that 
adjudicate debtor-creditor controversies. In addition, private groups 
and industry self-regulation have proved inadequate to combat the 
problem of consumer fraud.283 Despite the seriousness of these prob-
280. Due to the outdated record-keeping system of the common pleas court, it is 
impossible to determine what percentage of the default judgments entered by that 
court against defendants eventually lead to garnishments. The clerk estimates, and it 
seems reasonable to conclude, that almost all default judgments result in garnishment. 
Levin Interview, supra note 279. The common pleas court has experimented with a 
partial pa}ment plan as an alternative to garnishment. Under that plan, a judgment 
debtor may avoid garnishment by paying to the court weekly an amount that is com-
mensurate with his income and with the amount of the judgment. Unfortunately, 
during 1968-1969, 9,133 partial-payment orders were cancelled because of failure to pay, 
while only 13,330 new orders were entered. 1968 ANNUAL REPORT OF COMMON Pu:AS 
COURT 7. Thus the partial payment plan has not worked in Detroit, For discussions of 
wage garnishment, see Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and Recom-
mendations, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1214 (1965); Kerr, Wage Garnishment Should Be Pro-
hibited, 2 PROSP.Ecrus 371 (1968); Note, Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is 
a Denial of Due Process: The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas 
of the Law, 68 MICH, L. R.Ev. 986 (1970). 
281. The problem of lack of effective representation for defrauded consumers is 
basically one of money-the amounts in dispute are too small to warrant litigation-
and lack of knowledge on the part of the poor concerning how to utilize the services 
of attorneys. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. 
R.Ev. I, 46-48 (1969). One possible solution to that problem, the establishment of legal 
services for the poor, is currently hindered by a lack of funds. The Detroit legal ser-
vices office has only one attorney specializing in consumer cases, and he must conse-
quently limit himself to suits which are of precedent-setting value, The attorneys at 
the neighborhood offices are so pressed for time that they are often able to do little 
more than make a phone call or send a letter to an offending merchant. Many times 
such a merchant settles with complaining consumers as soon as he is informed that 
legal services are involved. But, while this provides restitution to some consumers, it 
has no deterrent value against continued unfair practices. Donnelly Interview, supra 
note 98. Moreover, test litigation undertaken by legal-services attorneys in an attempt 
to make the common law more responsive to the needs of the poor is expensive, 
lengthy, and usually fruitless. On the whole it is an ineffective alternative to statutory 
change as a vehicle for reform in the area of consumer protection. For an article il-
lustrating these difficulties, sec Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test 
Litigation, 44 N.Y.U, L. R.Ev. 115 (1969). 
282. In regard to the substantive problems of consumer suits for damages, see 
Hester, Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts-Does the Consumer Have a 
Private Remedy?, 1968 DuKE L.J. 831. 
283. See Comment, supra note 265, at 404-09. See also Project, The Direct Selling 
Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 UCLA L. R.Ev. 890, 931-42 (1969), in which the 
student author concluded that "the [Better Business) Bureau's capacity for aggressive pro· 
tection of consumers is drastically limited by jts need to avoid alienating its source 
of funds, the local businessmen." Id. at 940. Although the Detroit Better Business 
Bureau (BBB) handled over 18,000 complaints or inquiries last year, it is similarly 
limited in its ability to aid inner-city consumers effectively, The major handicap of the 
BBB is the fact that it does not enjoy the confidence of the poor consumers who are 
most in need of its assistance. This handicap is evidenced by the fact that one half of 
all complaints or inquiries to the BBB traditionally come not from the inner city or 
even Detroit, but from the more affluent suburban areas. Caucus, October 1969, at 1 
{BBB Newsletter). Indeed, the problem is so acute that poor consumers have under-
taken the task of organizing their own parallel group, the Consumer Protection As-
sociation, Inc, The objective of that association is to allow the poor to become involved 
in consumer protection activities and to utilize the power of organized consumers to 
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lems, state officials, including the Governor, do not seem to have 
placed a high priority on the restructuring of consumer legislation;284 
elicit needed reform. Interview with Consumer Research Advisory Council, Detroit, 
Michigan, Aug. 21, 1969. 
Perhaps the most fundamental handicap of the BBB in regard to its relationship 
with poor consumers is that it can do little to solve their problems. To most con• 
sumers, the primary function of the BBB is to adjust their complaints with merchants. 
Successful mediation, however, depends upon the willingness of the merchant to make 
some sort of restitution or to change his sales practices. Absent that willingness, the 
consumer may be advised to seek other remedies. Caucus, Sept. 1968, at 2. (Inter-
estingly enough, this publication, which mentions specific merchants engaging in 
fraudulent schemes, is not distributed to the general public.) If the deceptive practice 
of the scheme involved is pervasive enough, and if the violator refuses all requests for 
voluntary action, the BBB may inform various members of the advertising media and 
suggest that advertisements for the scheme be discontinued. Of course, this procedure 
reaches only deceptive advertisements and does so only long after the fraudulent 
practices have been instituted. As a last resort, the records of the BBB may be turned 
over to governmental authorities empowered to prosecute offenders engaging in con-
sumer fraud. But this last resort also fails to provide the defrauded consumer with 
relief for past fraudulent transactions of the dealer. 
The other major service of the BBB, answering inquiries from prospective cus-
tomers concerning the integrity of particular merchants, suffers because the informa• 
tion given is limited to the number of complaints against that merchant; no opinion 
is given regarding these practices. In addition, for those who have not had the fore-
sight to inquire before purchasing-probably the vast majority of low-income con-
sumers-this service is useless. 
The success of the self-imposed guidelines so favored by the BBB as a restraint 
upon merchants depends upon voluntary cooperation from the businessmen, and it 
seems unlikely that the patently fraudulent operators are going to be influenced by 
these standards. Special Report: Truth in Advertising, Caucus, Nov. 1968. In summary, 
it appears that the BBB, operating from its vantage point as an arm of the business 
community, is simply not attuned to the serious nature of the problems that inner-
city consumers face or to the need for strong action to alleviate those problems. The 
BBB may even have an over-all negative impact on consumer interests, since the BBB 
often opposes reform and provides businessmen with a friendly regulator to whom 
they can point in order to show that business does indeed "care." 
The other major business group, the Chamber of Commerce, is equally useless 
and is also a formidable opponent of reform. The Chamber of Commerce views its 
function as that of providing lines of communication between consumers and man-
agement in order to facilitate resolution of general consumer problems. To further 
this goal, the Chamber is working to have prominent business leaders speak to con• 
sumer groups both to allow consumers to air complaints and to educate consumers 
about their rights. While this program appears to be based upon good intentions, the 
Chamber suffers from an even greater distrust on the part of the poor consumer than 
does the BBB; leaders of consumer groups in Detroit are unanimous in their charac-
terization of the Chamber as the enemy, not the ally, of the poor consumer. Interview 
with the Consumers Research Advisory Council, supra. If the Chamber merely did 
nothing constructive to aid consumers, it would not be a major obstacle to consumer 
reform; the Chamber is, after all, a business group, not a consumer protection agency. 
But the Chamber does not remain passive; rather, it opposes all new legislation on 
the ground that present laws are sufficient. Its position is that additional legislation 
would "restrict" reputable businessmen and be nothing more than another tool for 
government to harass legitimate operators. Interview with Robert P. Marquart, Vice• 
President, Detroit Chamber of Commerce, Aug. 19, 1969. While this attitude is perhaps 
to be eJ<.pected from such a group, it is certainly evidence of the Chamber's inability 
to aid oppressed consumers. 
284. See Governor's State of the State Message, Jan. 15, 1970; Governor's Budget 
Message, Feb. 5, 1970. 
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and the few potentially helpful bills that have been recently intro-
duced languish in committee.285 
The need for statutory reform in most of the states has been recog-
nized by three eminent groups: the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), the Council of State Governments (CSG), and the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). 
Each has prepared a model consumer protection act.286 Several states 
have already enacted broad deceptive-practices legislation, patterned 
after the FTC or CSG model acts.287 
In form the three acts are quite similar; all are comprehensive 
deceptive-practices statutes which vest a single administrator-usually 
the state attorney general-with broad enforcement powers encom-
passing an array of remedial devices.288 Such legislation has been 
attacked by some advocates of consumer interests on the ground that 
it leads to an over-all reduction in activities which protect the con-
sumer.289 A survey by the Michigan Law Review indicates that in 
those states with comprehensive deceptive-practices legislation, prose-
cutors and other consumer protection agencies do tend to defer to 
the attorney general and to reduce substantially, if not to eliminate, 
their own antifraud activities.290 Nevertheless, this type of legislation 
does offer the advantages of coordination and consistent enforcement 
throughout the state. As the arguments of the critics suggest, however, 
care must be taken to ensure that the increased centralization of en-
forcement authority does not produce an illusory victory for the con-
sumer. Passing a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute without 
substantially increasing the powers and resources of the statute's ad-
ministrator would most likely reduce statewide protection efforts. 
But if the administrator is granted broad powers, it is difficult to 
imagine how the level of protection afforded consumers could be 
reduced. At least in Michigan, the various agencies charged with the 
responsibility of combatting consumer fraud have demonstrated so 
285. The Attorney General's proposal for enactment of the FTC's recommended 
act has not been considered by the legislature; the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 
has not been reported out of committee; and the proposal to establish a city con-
sumer agency in Detroit has not been enacted seven months after a special mayor's 
task force recommended the proposal to the legislature. Interview with Andrew Eiler, 
Executive Secretary, Michigan Consumers Council, Lansing, Michigan, Oct. 14, 
1969; Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
286. See notes 293-95 supra. The NCCUSL act is currently in the third tentative 
draft and is still being considered by committee. It has not been adopted by the whole 
conference. 
287. HAWAII REV. LAws §§ 205A-l to -22 (Supp. 1965); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 407.010-.130 
{Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 56:8-1 to -12 (1964); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.86.010-
.920 (Supp. 1968). 
288. See text accompanying notes 316-41 infra. 
289. See note 173 supra. See also Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Consumer 
Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLUM. L. REV. 445, 445-47 (1968). 
290. See note 175 supra and accompan}ing text. 
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little success in that endeavor that almost any effective action from 
another source would be a distinct improvement. 
In Michigan, the administrator of a deceptive-practices statute 
should be the Attorney General. His role as administrator under such 
a statute would be in keeping with his role as chief law-enforcement 
officer of the state. Moreover, the Attorney General's office already 
has a Consumer Fraud Bureau-although it is currently understaffed 
and inadequately funded291-which could be expanded to provide 
the administrative apparatus necessary to implement a pervasive con-
sumer fraud statute. Finally, since the Attorney General is basically 
a prosecutorial official, he can be expected to take more vigorous and 
forthright action against dishonest merchants than would other agen-
cies or officials who view themselves more as administrative function-
aries than as law enforcers. As mentioned previously,292 it might be 
useful to provide county prosecutors-particularly those in counties 
that enclose urban areas-with concurrent jurisdiction under the 
deceptive-practices statute, or to make them agents of the Attorney 
General for the purpose of enforcing the statutory provisions. The 
latter possibility is perhaps the more desirable one, since it would 
avoid dispersal of authority and would help to maintain the central-
ized character of the enforcement process. 
In order to be effective, a deceptive-practices statute must meet 
several basic requirements. First, it must be truly comprehensive, 
that is, it must include within its coverage as many varieties of 
fraudulent practices as possible. The FTC proposed act defines the 
scope of its coverage very broadly by prohibiting unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade.293 The CSG act accepts 
this broad definition as the most appropriate one,294 while the 
NCCUSL act simply prohibits any deceptive practice in a consumer 
transaction.295 The NCCUSL act further defines the general category 
deceptive act, without limiting its scope, by listing thirteen practices 
that are specifically prohibited.296 Unlike other statutes in which 
enumeration of prohibited acts adds little to the coverage,287 the 
NCCUSL act probably reaches more deceptive methods with the 
specification than without. The first twelve subsections are ap-
parently an attempt to ensure that the most common deceptive prac-
tices are prohibited, including "bait" advertising,298 misrepresenting 
291. See text accompanying notes 268-72 supra. 
292. See text accompanying notes 181-82 supra. 
293. FI'C UNIFORM Ac::r § 2. See also § 3, whic;h mandates that courts of the en-
acting state are to be guided by judicial interpretations given to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(5) (1964). See note 43 supra. 
294. CSG Ac::r § 2, alternative I. 
295. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(a). 
296. NCCUSL Acr §§ 2{b)(l)-(12), (c). 
297. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-115(c) (Supp. 1968). 
298. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(b)(6); see note 142 supra. 
April 1970] Comments 973 
used goods as new,299 and referral sales,300 while the last section is 
aimed at unconscionable transactions.301 The last section is necessary 
because of the possibility that some overreaching activities by mer-
chants may not constitute deceptive practices within the meaning of 
that term as it is usually defined;302 in that event the general prohibi-
tion against unconscionability should be available as a final protec-
tion for the consumer.303 If a practice is neither deceptive nor uncon-
scionable, it probably should be beyond the reach of a regulatory 
statute, and any confusion by the consumer will have to be alleviated 
by consumer education or self-regulation. In summary, the best ap-
proach to providing maximum protection for the consumer seems to 
be adoption of the FTC standard, supplemented by the NCCUSL 
299. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(b)(3). 
300. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2(b)(ll). A referral sale is one in which the consumer is in-
duced to purchase goods by the seller's representations to the consumer that the con-
sumer will be able to recoup the purchase price by referring others to the seller as 
potential customers. In reality, the odds against any consumer earning as much as his 
purchase price by referring potential customers to the seller are astronomical. For an 
illustrative case, see Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 
1966). 
301. NCCUSL Ac::r § 2 (emphasis added): 
(c) An act or practice of a supplier is unlawful, if: 
(1) it is unconscionable; and 
(2) the unconscionability involves a consumer transaction. 
(d) Without limiting the scope of subsection (c) the following factors are to be 
considered in applying that subsection: 
(I) that the supplier has knowingly taken advantage of the inability of the con-
sumer reasonably to protect his interests by reason of physical or mental 
infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of 
the agreement, lack of education, or similar factors; 
(2) that the supplier has knowingly charged a price which is grossly in excess 
of the price at which similar property or services is readily obtainable in 
similar consumer transactions by lik~ consumers; 
(ll) that the supplier knew at the time of the consumer transaction of the in-
ability of the consumer to receive substantial benefits from the subject of 
the consumer transaction; or 
(4) that the supplier knowingly required the consumer to waive substantial 
legal rights. 
The only difficulty with this section is the requirement of knowledge on the part 
of the supplier. Not only does that requirement present a substantial evidentiary prob-
lem for the prosecutor-even with his ability to obtain records and oral testimony-
but it also deprives the consumer of needed relief. To a consumer who has purchased 
goods that are worthless, or are grossly overpriced, it makes little difference whether 
or not the merchant had knowledge of the unconscionable nature of the transaction. 
302. For example, a statement concerning the quality of goods may be only 
"puffing," an opinion to the average consumer and hence not deceptive. The same 
statement if made to a poor, ignorant consumer may still not be deceptive, but it 
probably is unconscionable. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the 
Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U. L. R.Ev. 559, 597-98 (1968), 
803. Consumers can, of course, rely on UCC § 2-302, which prohibits unconscion-
able contractual provisions, but a similar prohibition in a deceptive-practices statute 
might be more effective. The NCCUSL act, for example, provides a broader range of 
remedies than is available under UCC § 2-302. See text accompanying notes 325·31 
infra. Moreover, the additional guidelines presented in the NCCUSL act concerning 
what constitutes unconscionable conduct may stimulate the courts to extend the con-
cept to more unfair transactions. 
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act's specifications, particularly its prohibition against unconscionable 
transactions. 
The second basic requirement of an effective deceptive-practices 
statute is that it provide the attorney general with broad investigative 
and decision-making powers. Ideally the attorney general should do 
more than simply prosecute individual cases based upon consumer 
complaints. He should be granted authority to conduct investigations 
and to issue rulings in order to help establish standards of conduct 
for dealers covered by the statute. The power to investigate, along 
with the authority to request both documentary evidence and the 
presence of witnesses, should not be limited to judicial proceedings. 
A provision granting the attorney general broad investigative powers 
would allow him to keep abreast of developments in the marketing 
of retail goods and would assist him in formulating consumer educa-
tion programs to inform the public about the types of fraudulent 
schemes and practices that are currently being used by merchants. 
The statute should also grant the attorney general the authority to 
issue a specific advisory ruling at the request of a businessman, since 
that authority would allow merchants to ascertain the legality of a 
particular sales practice before putting it into operation and would 
thus protect the public from potentially injurious activities.304 Fi-
nally, granting the attorney general the power to establish general 
regulations would be desirable, because such regulations could be 
used by reputable merchants as guidelines for fair conduct.305 
In this area the NCCUSL act provides the narrowest provisions. 
Although it permits public hearings to be held at any time,806 it 
allows investigations only when there is probable cause to believe 
304. The use of advisory opinions would remove one of the arguments against 
strict enforcement of a broad range of statutory remedies-the fear of injuring inno• 
cent businessmen. If the declaratory or advisory ruling, as opposed to a general regula-
tion, were made appealable, the merchant would be able to embark on a course of 
conduct with full knowledge of its legal implications. If the merchant were to choose 
not to avail himself of the right to obtain an advisory opinion, there would be no 
reason for not applying sanctions against him. 
A specific advisory ruling would be binding on the state, but only with respect to 
the merchant requesting the ruling, unless the administrator were to adopt the ruling 
as a regulation. Consumers, however, should be bound neither by a private ruling of 
the administrator nor by any general regulations defining permissible conduct. This 
freedom would permit the private suit to operate as a continuing check upon any 
complacency of, or lack of innovative action by, the state agency. See Spanogle, The 
U3C-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 624, 629-S0 (1968). 
305. Not only would reputable merchants be sure of what is legal, but the public 
would have a standard by which to judge a seller's practices. That standard would 
help to provide another enforcement tool-public opinion and consumer pressure. 
Most merchants are probably sufficiently afraid of losing business that they will not 
engage in practices that the public can readily identify as illegal. Publishing guidelines 
might also generate more complaints, since the public would realize that certain acts 
are illegal and that such acts can be stopped. See Spanogle, supra note 304, at 629. 
306. NCCUSL Acr § 4(a). 
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that an individual has committed a violation.807 The FTC proposed 
act, on the other hand, requires only that an investigation relate to 
a "possible" violation of the statute,308 while the CGS act stipulates 
simply that an investigation is permissible if it appears to the attorney 
general that a dealer has engaged in, or is about to engage in, a prac-
tice violative of the act.300 In addition, the CSG provisi_on permits the 
attorney general, whenever he deems it to be in the public interest, 
to undertake an investigation in order to ascertain whether a viola-
tion is being committed.310 Both the NCCUSL and the CSG acts 
permit the attorney general to issue regulations and guidelines defin-
ing deceptive practices,311 but the FTC statute contains no provisions 
relating to those matters. Unlike the NCCUSL provision, however, 
the CSG act stipulates that such regulations are to have the force of 
law.312 Only the NCCUSL act specifically authorizes the attorney 
general to render advisory opinions,313 but it is arguable that such 
power is included in the right to make regulations. Under all three 
acts, failure to comply with a court order enforcing an investigative 
demand is punishable by contempt sanctions;314 but the CSG pro-
posal goes even further and provides that, if a suspected violator 
refuses to cooperate, a court, upon the motion of the attorney gen-
eral, may enjoin the violator from doing business or may remove his 
307. NCCUSL Acr §§ 4(a), (b), (c). The provision for a public hearing does not give 
the administrator the authority to administer oaths, to compel attendance of witnesses, 
or to subpoena records; that power is given only when an investigation is authorized, 
and such an investigation may be undertaken only if there is probable cause that a 
merchant is violating the act. The drafters of the act, however, apparently do not in-
tend to require the same level of evidence to establish probable cause under the act 
as would be required to establish probable cause to arrest a suspect in a criminal case. 
The "slightest amount" of proof showing a violation would be enough to establish 
probable cause under the NCCUSL act; only the so-called "fishing expedition" would 
be prohibited. Interview with William J. Pierce, Executive-Secretary, NCCUSL, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, Feb. 27, 1970. The actual standard envisioned, then, seems to be 
much less stringent than that applied to criminal cases. But care should be taken in 
drafting such a standard to ensure that the wording used clearly communicates the 
desired meaning. In the hands of an unfriendly or ignorant judge, the term "probable 
cause" could be interpreted much more strictly than the term "slightest amount." 
308. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 7(a). 
309. CSG Ac::r § ll(a). 
310. CSG § ll(a). 
311. NCCUSL Acr § 4(b); CSG Acr § 3(a). A later section in the NCCUSL act 
authorizing the administrator to ask for a declaratory judgment concerning the legal-
ity of any conduct casts doubt upon the force that the rulings are intended to have. 
It seems that those rulings are simply "advisory" and are not to be given the same 
weight as a formal administrative regulation. 
312, CSG Acr § 12. 
313. NCCUSL Acr § 4(b). The administrator must first consult with "interested 
parties," presumably business and consumer groups, and must hold hearings "if ap-
propriate." 
314. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 7(i); CSG Acr § 14(3); NCCUSL Acr § 4(c)(3). 
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corporate charter.315 Obviously, severe sanctions are needed to deal 
with uncooperative suspects, since a dealer's refusal to cooperate not 
only indicates a greater likelihood that he has committed a violation, 
but also makes it more difficult for the attorney general to gain access 
to the dealer's records and thus in many instances may reduce the 
chance for conviction.316 It would be anomalous to allow a fraudulent 
merchant to continue in business, simply because he refuses to obey 
an investigative order. 
The third requirement of a deceptive-practices statute is that it 
provide the attorney general with a wide range of effective enforce-
ment powers which he can use both to stop the prohibited conduct 
and to obtain restitution for defrauded consumers. In this connec-
tion, the attorney general may, of course, be empowered to make use 
of the adjudicatory process of the courts. All three model acts have 
provisions permitting the attorney general to seek an injunction 
ordering the merchant involved to cease the fraudulent practices 
in which he is allegedly engaged or in which there is reason to believe 
he is about to engage.317 All three statutes provide that, if the injunc-
tion is violated, a penalty may be exacted from the off ending dealer. 
The FTC proposed act provides for a penalty of 2,500 dollars for 
violating the injunction,318 the CSG act mandates the same penalty 
for each violation,319 and the NCCUSL statute establishes a 5,000-
dollar fine for each day that the merchant continues the deceptive 
practice.320 Two of the acts, however-the FTC statute and the 
NCCUSL statute-have a significant drawback. Under both, if a 
court finds that a practice violative of the act is occurring or is about 
to occur, it may issue an injunction prohibiting the merchant from 
315. CSG Acr § 14(1), (2), (3); see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, § 266 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, § 8 (Supp. 1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-6 
(1964). 
316. Discovery and subpoena powers would allow the attorney general to obtain 
quickly and easily important information such as the wholesale price of goods sold, 
the source of allegedly "new" merchandise, or the actual quantity of advertised goods 
that was available for sale. While much of this information could probably be ob-
tained under Michigan's civil discovery rules (see MICH. CT. R. 302-13), arming the 
Attorney General with the authority to issue his own discovery orders has many ad-
vantages. He could pursue his inquiries without the necessity of litigation; he could 
not be compelled to submit to deposition or discovery by the defendant; and he would 
not be bound by the requirement that the material sought or the questions asked be 
admissible as evidence. Perhaps of greatest significance would be the additional penal-
ties prescribed for failure to comply with a court order enforcing a demand. See text 
accompanying note 315 supra, Providing the attorney general only with the powers 
available to an ordinary litigant, then, needlessly limits the flexibility of the state in 
obtaining needed information, and encourages defendants to delay enforcement pro-
ceedings. 
317, FTC Acr § 5; CSG Acr § 5; NCCUSL Ar;r § 5. 
318. FTC UNIFORM Ar;r § 8. 
319. CSG Acr § 15(a). It is conceivable that under this provision each sale could be 
a violation. 
320. NCCUSL Acr § 5(a)(l). 
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engaging in that practice in the future;821 but neither statute per-
mits an injunction to be issued prohibiting the future use by a 
merchant of a deceptive practice which he has used in the past but 
which he is no longer using or cannot be shown to be contemplating. 
Thus it may be possible for a dealer, by desisting temporarily from 
the illegal conduct, to defeat the issuance of an injunction unless 
the attorney general can show that there is teason to believe that the 
dealer's deceptive practices will continue. In order to make such a 
showing, the attorney general would have to overcome difficult evi-
dentiary problems. The CSG statute, however, allows an injunction 
to be based on past actions as well as on present and future actions.322 
Indeed, there is no compelling reason to shield fraudulent merchants 
from an injunction simply because they have temporarily ceased us-
ing their deceptive practices. A deceptive-practices statute, then, 
should allow injunctive orders to be drawn broadly enough to pro-
hibit all future use not only of those deceptive practices that are 
occurring or are about to occur, but also of those deceptive practices 
in which the merchant has engaged in the past.323 Such an order 
would provide maximum protection to the public without encroach-
ing upon any protected rights of the accused dealer. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute should 
ensure not only that fraudulent practices are discontinued, but also 
that defrauded victims get their money back. Too many existing 
"consumer protection" statutes do not provide complete protection 
to consumers, since they provide only for an injunction of deceptive 
practices and do not make a corresponding effort to allow the attor-
ney general to seek restitution or some other form of relief for de-
frauded victims.324 In this regard, the FTC statute leaves much to 
be desired; it stipulates that a court may issue an injunction when it 
finds that a practice violative of the act is occurring or is about to 
occur, but it does not permit the court to provide the defrauded 
consumers with any form of relief.325 The remedial provision con-
tained in the CSG act, however, does provide substantial relief to 
321. ITC UNIFORM Acr § 5; NCCUSL Acr § 5(a)(l). 
322. CSG Acr § 5. 
323. Whether the injunction is based only on present and future deceptive praC• 
tices or whether it is based also on past practices, it is clear that the court is not lim-
ited to prohibiting merely the precise act which violated the statute. It may also 
enjoin related practices. See ITC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392-95 (1965). 
324. See HAWAII REv. LAWS § 205A-13 (Supp. 1965); IowA CODE § 713 (1966); N.Y. 
ExEc. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1969); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 18.86.080 (Supp. 
1968). 
325. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 5. The provision does allow the issuance of an injunction 
without a showing of persistent or continuous fraudulent conduct, as is required by 
some statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63(12) (McKinney Supp. 1969). The provision 
also does not require a showing that the dealer acted with an intent that others rely. 
Some statutes do require probable reliance by a consumer. See, e.g., Illinois Consumer 
Fraud Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121½, § 262 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969). 
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defrauded consumers. Under that act, a court may issue, along with 
the injunction, an order requiring the dealer to return to a defrauded 
consumer all money or property acquired from the consumer through 
the use of the fraudulent practice.326 In order to implement that 
order, the court may appoint a receiver to gather the assets of the 
defendant and to pay out those assets to injured customers. The 
NCCUSL act contains similar provisions for granting restitution,327 
but such a remedy is conditioned upon a showing by the administra-
tor either that the supplier knew or in the exercise of ordinary care 
should have known that the acts involved were deceptive, or else that 
he knew that they were unconscionable.328 Thus the administrator 
is forced to show not only the fact that the acts were committed by 
the supplier and were deceptive, but also the state of mind of the 
supplier. Since in the normal case the administrator's staff is insuffi-
cient and overworked, this necessity will probably lead to much less 
litigation and thus to much less relief for defrauded consumers.320 
There seems to be no sound reason for exempting innocent conduct 
from nonpunitive sanctions.330 The purpose of a deceptive-practice 
statute is not to prosecute the dishonest merchant in a criminal sense, 
but to protect the public from conduct that is deceptive or uncon-
scionable. This section of the NCCUSL act is particularly illogical in 
that the harshest sanction-the injunction with its 5,000 dollars per 
day fine for violation-is imposed on innocent violators, whereas 
lesser restrictions are reserved for the violator meeting a higher 
standard of culpability. 
In addition to providing nonpunitive remedies-injunction and 
restitution-for all types of violations, a deceptive-practices statute 
should contain a penalty for willful violations of its terms. The only 
one of the proposed statutes that does so is the CGS act which imposes 
a fine of 200 dollars for each willful violation of the statute.331 Simply 
ordering the willful violator to cease his deceptive practice and to 
326. CSG Acr § 6; see Mo . .ANN. STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1968); N.J. STAT. ANN, 
§ 56:8-8 (1964). 
327. NCCUSL Acr § 5. 
328. NCCUSL Acr §§ 5(b), (2)(b). This standard exempts innocent conduct from 
any sanction except the injunction. 
329. See text accompanying note 16-33 supra. If the administrator does not have 
available sufficient clerical, legal, and investigative personnel, even his discovery and 
subpoena powers will often be insufficient to obtain the evidence needed to show in-
tent. In addition, even in those cases in which the practice involved is blatant enough 
to allow a presumption of knowledge, there may be problems concerning the liability 
of a supplier for acts of his agents. 
330. Of course, since these merchants are innocent, they should be e."<empt from 
punitive sanctions. See text accompanying notes 331·32 infra. 
331. CSG Acr § 15(c). A willful violation occurs when the merchant "knew or 
should have known bis conduct was a violation of section 2 of this act." This standard 
is precisely the same as the one which the NCCUSL act establishes for obtaining any 
relief other than an injunction. 
April 1970] Comments 979 
make restitution to the consumer, and not also imposing a separate 
fine for the violation, would have little deterrent effect upon the con-
tinuation of illegal practices by dealers, especially if the scope of the 
court's order is limited to the precise deceptive practice involved in 
the case.832 In this regard the distinction between willful and negli-
gent conduct is justified. A dealer intentionally committing deceptive 
practices and defrauding consumers should not be given a statutory 
guarantee that he faces no greater risks than that of the compelled 
termination of the particular practice in which he is found to have 
engaged, and that of the loss of the benefits which he has obtained 
through the violation. 
The drafters of the model acts recognized that adjudication in a 
court is often a costly and lengthy process. Hence, they sought to 
provide some alternative means of resolving the many cases that 
might arise under the statute but do not involve serious infractions 
and do not necessarily require court action. The three acts adopt the 
same method for dealing with such cases: each provides that the at-
torney general can, at his discretion, accept an assurance of discon-
tinuance from the dealer in lieu of further enforcement proceed-
ings.333 The filing of an assurance by the dealer does not constitute 
an admission of guilt, and the assurance itself is not usable as evi-
dence of the dealer's misconduct in any subsequent proceeding. Nev-
ertheless, under the NCCUSL act, breach of an assurance is treated 
in the same manner as is breach of an injunction.334 The other two 
acts contain less stringent provisions which simply state that, if an 
assurance is breached, the attorney general has the opportunity to 
reopen the case closed by the acceptance of the assurance.335 Another 
provision unique to the NCCUSL act is its requirement that an as-
surance provide for the return of money to defrauded consumers.336 
Such a provision is desirable, since it allows the attorney general to 
avoid the time and expense of litigation and at the same time does 
not sacrifice the interests of the complaining consumers. 
All three acts require that, after an assurance is submitted, it must 
332. See note 323 supra. 
333. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 6; CSG Acr § 10; NCCUSL Acr § 5(d). 
334. NCCUSL Acr § 5(d). 
335. FTC UNIFORM Acr § 6; CSG Acr § 10. 
336. NCCUSL Acr § 5(d). Section 4(c)(6) .of the same act allows an investigation 
into the practices of a specific supplier to be terminated upon acceptance of an as-
surance of discontinuance. Under that section, the assurance may be conditioned upon 
return of money to the consumers damaged by the supplier's deceptive practices, but 
there is no requirement, as there is in § 5(d), that a determination be made concerning 
the appropriateness of restitution. In addition, court approval of an assurance is not 
required, as it is under § 5(d). The more logical approach seems to be to amend § 5(d) 
to include termination of investigations as well as enforcement proceedings, thus pro-
viding the same requirements for each. Obviously if the investigation determines only 
that a deceptive practice has been committed and does not reveal any defrauded con-
sumers, no restitution would be necessary until such consumers are ascertained. 
980 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 68:925 
be filed with, and approved by, a court of general jurisdiction,887 
presumably to ensure that the public interest is protected by the at-
torney general's disposition of the case. In practice, however, this 
approval procedure is likely to become nothing more than a clerical 
ritual. The acts should therefore be amended to pern1it interested 
parties to intervene if they are not satisfied with the tetn1s of the 
assurance. Such a section would constitute a meaningful check upon 
less than vigorous administrative action. 
A section providing for an assurance procedure is vital to the 
effective functioning of a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute. 
In light of the delays and costs that attend judicial proceedings, it 
would be virtually impossible for an attorney general to do an ade-
quate job of enforcing such a statute if he were compelled to vindi-
cate every legitimate complaint in a court of law. The assurance 
procedure allows the attorney general to deal with the bulk of the 
routine cases in a summary manner, and it reserves adjudicatory pro-
ceedings for particularly serious violators. Moreover, if the assurance 
provisions are strict-as they are in the NCCUSL model act-little 
is sacrificed in the way of deterrence of future conduct or in the way 
of relief to consumers. The use of the assurance procedure also adds 
vigor to the mediation procedure, which is already present in most 
states,338 but which by itself is not broad or forceful enough to curb 
all deceptive practices. 839 The possibility that a merchant would be 
compelled to submit an assurance in order to avoid an injunction, 
and the stringent penalties for the violation of the assurance, pro-
vide a strong inducement for the merchant to agree to a settlement.840 
The utility of having an assurance procedure in conjunction with 
mediation is exemplified by the experience in states which have al-
ready enacted comprehensive deceptive-practices legislation provid-
ing for both of these inforn1al procedures. Although the attorney 
general in such states is given broad injunctive powers, very little 
337. FTC UNIFORM Am: § 6; CSG Am: § IO; NCCUSL Am: § 5(d). Under the 
NCCUSL act, the court must determine that a provision for restitution has been made 
part of the assurance. 
338. Mediation will probably be carried on in those states with consumer fraud 
bureaus even if the bureau is not charged with enforcing a deceptive-practices statute. 
See notes 265-75 supra and accompanying text. Saxbe, The Role of the Government 
in Consumer Protection: The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the 
Ohio Attorney General, 29 OHl0 ST. L.J. 897 (1968). 
339. Mediation by itself is not effective to ensure that merchants desist from pro-
hibited conduct, nor does it operate to return money to all defrauded consumers. No 
matter how persuasive the Attorney General may be, many habitually fraudulent 
dealers will refuse to settle. Platsis Interview, supra note 44. 
340. The advantage of having several levels of activity, with greater sanctions at 
each, is that such flexibility provides needed leverage to the administrator. Habitual 
violators in Detroit do not settle because they do not fear any real sanctions unless 
their conduct is blatant enough to come under one 0£ the criminal statutes; even then 
the possibility of penalty no more severe than a fine does not have much deterrent 
effect. Providing the administrator with considerable authority and discretion will 
make the less formal remedies, such as mediation, viable. 
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actual litigation takes place and most of the cases are settled either 
by mediation or by assurances.341 
In addition to granting to the attorney general a broad array of 
enforcement powers, a comprehensive deceptive-practices statute 
should grant a defrauded consumer effective private remedies that 
he can invoke without the approval or the cooperation of state law-
enforcement officials. The defrauded consumer should not be forced 
to rely completely upon some governmental official in order to ob-
tain relief; different officials have different attitudes about consumer 
affairs, and an attorney general unsympathetic to the plight of de-
frauded consumers could, by adopting a policy of inaction, enfeeble 
even the most stringent and pervasive deceptive-practices statute. 
Moreover, even if the attorney general is earnestly committed to a 
policy of attacking consumer fraud, it does not seem likely that the 
state legislature-in light of the usual scarcity of financial resources 
available for governmental expenditures-would provide the funds 
necessary for an effective antifraud effort. Thus, in order to make a 
deceptive-practices statute truly effective, a provision for private 
remedies must be included in the statute in order to complement 
the state enforcement provisions.342 
The FTC proposed act does not grant any private. remedies to 
the consumer. The NCCUSL act and the CSG act, on the other hand, 
provide that any dealer who violates the act is liable for damages to 
341. The vast majority of cases in such states are settled informally, through medi-
ation or administrative action. Litigation involves only about 5% of the disputes. See 
Mindel, The New York Bureau of Consumer Frauds and Protection-A Review of Its 
Consumer Protection Activities, 11 N.Y.L.F. 603-04 (1965): Rice, supra note 302, at 590 
n.133. 
342. A special committee of the Antitrust Section of the ABA has recently recom-
mended that Congress enact legislation empowering the FTC to award damages to 
consumers after a successful prosecution by the Commission or the Justice Department. 
The ABA proposal would preclude private class actions by consumers both before and 
after governmental action. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1970, § C at 30, col. I. An advantage 
of this proposal is that it avoids both lengthy litigation and large attorneys fees. 
However, the consumers' action is tied to two federal agencies that may or may not 
share the views of the low-income consumer concerning the need for the action. The 
proposed remedy would be viable only if the consumer possessed the right to maintain 
a class action independent of any government action. Both the NCCUSL and CSG acts 
permit consumer class actions. See note 354 infra and accompanying text. There should 
be a requirement, however, that the attorney general be informed of the institution 
of any private suit under the act; this requirement would help to minimize duplication 
of effort. The attorney general should also be allowed to intervene in private suits 
with the approval of the plaintiffs; such intervention would be warranted if a par-
ticularly large violator is the defendant or if the defendant's actions involve various 
parts of the state. The need for private remedial actions in the consumer protection 
field is reinforced by the financial inability of state enforcement to cope with the 
problem. This necessity can be illustrated by analogy to the enforcement of antitrust 
laws. It has been estimated that in order to obtain the current level of enforcement 
of antitrust legislation without private antitrust suits, the Justice Department Antitrust 
Division would have to increase its staff fourfold. See Barber, Private Enforcement of 
the Antitrust Laws: The Robinson Patman Experience, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181, 
183-84 n.10 (1961); Spanogle, The UJC-It May Look Pretty, But Is It Enforceable?, 
29 Omo ST. L.J. 624, 627 n.14 (1968). 
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consumers injured by the violation.343 Furthermore, each of those 
two acts stipulates that any judgment against a dealer which is issued 
by a court in enforcement proceedings initiated by the administrator 
of the act, is prima fade evidence of the dealer's liability when that 
judgment is raised as evidence in a subsequent suit brought by a 
consumer whom the dealer has defrauded.344 Both the NCCUSL act 
and the CSG act provide for a very small minimum damage award 
which is to be granted to any successful plaintiff; one hundred dollars 
is the minimum award under the former act345 and uv-o hundred 
dollars is the award under the latter.346 The CSG act authorizes the 
court in its discretion to award punitive damages as well.347 
It is doubtful that the possibility of obtaining nominal minimum 
damages would by itself provide the needed incentive for attorneys 
and individual consumers to become involved in the lengthy and 
burdensome process of litigation.348 Most consumer fraud suits in-
volve relatively small amounts of money. Thus there is little likeli-
hood in most cases that compensatory damages will exceed the 
amount provided for by the minimum awards. As a result, the 
amount of remuneration obtainable by an attorney operating on a 
contingent-fee basis would in most cases probably not be sufficient 
to motivate trial attorneys to leave the more lucrative fields of per-
sonal-injury and products-liability litigation. Yet making the mini-
mum award high enough to lure attorneys into the business of repre-
senting defrauded consumers would probably put too great a strain 
on commerce. 
One way to make consumer fraud suits attractive to lawyers might 
be to include a provision in a deceptive-practices statute calling for 
the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to successful litigants. Both 
the CSG act and the NCCUSL act authorize such an award, but they 
do so under different circumstances. The CSG act simply states that 
the court may award such fees349 but it offers no guidelines to the 
judge concerning when such an award should be made. In light of 
the traditional reluctance of judges to award attorneys' fees without 
specific guidelines,350 this provision may not stimulate many lawyers 
to undertake suits on behalf of defrauded consumers. 
343. NCCUSL Am: § 7; CSG Am: § 8. 
344. NCCUSL Am: § 7(d); CSG Acr § 8(e). 
345. NCCUSL Am: § 7(a)(I). 
346. CSG Am: § 8(a). 
347. CSG Am: § 8(b). 
348. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 
I, 46-48 (1969). 
349. CSG Am: § 8(d). 
350. Attorneys' fees have been traditionally regarded as extraordinary damages and 
have not been included in compensatory or punitive-damage awards. See Rice, supra 
note 302, at 570. 
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The NCCUSL act is more definitive and allows an award of 
attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff if the defendant-dealer knew 
or should have known, at the time he committed the violation of the 
act, that his illegal conduct was deceptive, or if he knew at that time 
that his illegal conduct was unconscionable.351 Under the NCCUSL 
act, therefore, every successful litigant is entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees, since knowledge is an essential element of an offense 
under the act.362 Ideally, a provision calling for an award of attorneys' 
fees should be broadly framed so as to afford plaintiffs the oppor-
tunity to recover fees in any successful action that arises under the 
statute. Such a provision would make legitimate consumer suits 
financially attractive to lawyers and would thus provide defrauded 
consumers with greater opportuity to undertake productive litigation 
against dishonest merchants. 
Because of the inefficiency of having a separate action for each 
of a large number of consumer complaints against a particular mer-
chant, it would be useful to provide some means by which consumers 
could join together in a single action against a merchant who had 
defrauded them. The method most often discussed is that of a con-
sumer class action.353 Such a class action would offer several advan-
tages: (1) it would allow consumers to combine claims so that the 
full extent of the defendant-dealer's wrongdoing is presented before 
the court; (2) it would enable consumers, particularly those with low 
incomes, to utilize scarce legal talent to their best advantage; (3) 
it would encourage attorneys to undertake consumer suits because of 
the possibility of significant remuneration; (4) it would enable neigh-
borhood legal clinics and other groups concerned about consumer 
affairs to bring against flagrantly dishonest merchants suits alleging 
a multitude of violations; and (5) it would eliminate wasteful mul-
tiplicity of actions. 
The NCCUSL act and the CGS act include provisions that permit 
consumer class actions.3:;4 Under those two statutes, the court can give 
injunctive relief to the class even though the individual consumers 
in the class may have an adequate remedy at law.355 Some commen-
tators feel that consumer class actions may be possible even without 
351. NCCUSL Ac:r § 7(c)(2). The standard for awarding attorneys' fees is the same 
as that for maintaining a successful action under the act. See note 320 supra and ac-
companying text. 
352. See note 320 supra and accompanying text. 
353. See Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 
44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 80 (1969); Rice, supra note 302, at 579-83; Starrs, The Consumer 
Class Action-Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U. L. REv. 211 (1969); Starrs, The 
Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerations of Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REv. 407 
(1969). 
354. CSG Ac:r § 8(b); NCCUSL Ac:r § 7{a)(2), (3). 
355. CSG Ac:r § 8(b); NCCUSL Ac:r § 7{a)(2). 
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statutory change;356 but a true class action,357 at least in Michigan, 
is probably not possible without legislative authorization.358 There is 
a possibility that the availability of consumer class actions would en-
courage unethical attorneys to solicit claims or to encourage frivolous 
suits.3119 But such unethical practices could be minimized through the 
use of adequate discovery devices and through supervision of the 
conduct of attorneys by courts and bar associations. 
It would be a mistake to view the passage of a comprehensive 
deceptive-practices statute in Michigan as a panacea for the problem 
of fraud in the market place. If such a statute is enacted, it will then 
be necessary for the legislature to turn its attention to the matter of 
adequately funding the office of the Attorney General so that its 
Consumer Fraud Bureau may be staffed with enough attorneys to 
administer the statute effectively. In addition, the legislature will 
356. Starrs, supra note 353; Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Con-
sumer Protection, 33 U. CHI, L. R.Ev. 590 (1966) (dealing with consumer actions for 
injunctions). 
357. A true class action is one in which the right to be enforced is joint or common, 
or in which the right is secondary "in that the owner of the primary right refuses to 
enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it." 
MicH. CT. R. 208.1(1). The advantage of this type of action is that nonparty members 
of the class are bound by the judgment and thus do not have to relitigate. See MICH. 
CT. R. 605-06. International Typographical Union v. Macomb Co., 306 Mich. 562, 11 
N.W.2d 242 (1943). 
358. See Starrs, supra note 353. Professor Starrs deals with class actions both for 
injunctive relief and for damages. The problem which a class faces in obtaining in-
junctive relief is the same as that faced by individuals-the normal equity requirement 
that one seeking such an order be threatened with prospective injury and have no 
adequate remedy at law. The consumer who has already been injured does not face 
future fraudulent dealings by the same merchant, and he, at least in theory, has a 
common-law action for damages. There seems to be no question that in Michigan 
consumers can band together to seek injunctive relief [see Dole, supra note 355, at 
107-09], but it seems unlikely they can present a suitable case, absent statutory reform, 
for enjoining future deceptive practices. It also seems unlikely that a group of con• 
sumers who are attempting to obtain damage awards based upon separate transactions 
with the same dealer will be successful in utilizing a true class action. When no com-
mon right is involved, but only common questions of fact or of law-as in the typical 
consumer fraud case-the class action will probably be considered "spurious." Dole, 
supra note 353, at 94. The "spurious" class action is thought to be merely a joinder 
device, binding only those members of the class who are parties to the litigation. 
J. HONIGMAN &: c. HAWKINS, MICHIGAN COURT RUI.ES ANNOTATED 605 (1962). There is 
the possibility that a spurious action could be converted into a true classification if 
the plaintiffs give notice of the suit to all the members of the class. MICH, CT. R. 208.4 
provides that the court may order that notice be given to absent parties in order to 
protect the interests of the class. Since the plaintiffs will probably not have knowledge 
of all the consumers who have dealt with a merchant, it should also be possible under 
this rule to require the defendant to provide names and addresses of such individuals. 
Even if such a requirement is not possible, however, several consumers should be able 
to join as plaintiffs to facilitate suit against a single defendant. MICH. CT. R. 206 pro-
vides that parties may join as plaintiffs even when there are no longer questions of 
fact or law so long as the administration of justice will be facilitated and the defendant 
will not be prejudiced. In any event, it appears that lawyers for the poor, including 
those in Detroit, have not attempted in any significant way to use this potentially 
powerful tool. Starrs, supra note 356, at 509; Donnelly Interview, supra note 98. 
-359_ K.ripke, supra note 348, at 48; Starrs, supra note 356, at 409. 
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have to consider ways of implementing consumer education programs 
-particularly in inner-city areas-so that consumers will be able to 
utilize the increased protection afforded to them by the statute. Fur-
thermore, it seems certain that, so long as poverty exists in society, 
there will be an inordinate number of unscrupulous merchants prey-
ing upon poor artd ignorant consumers. 
Nevertheless, the initial step is the enactment of a statute that 
provides the enforcement officials in the state with the legal arma-
ments necessary to wage an effective battle against consumer fraud. 
The enactment of such a statute would significantly improve the 
stature of Michigan's consumer protection efforts and would be a 
welcome sign to those whom affluence has left behind, that govern-
ment has not forgotten their plight. 
